The Debate on Physician-Assisted Suicide Reaches the Federal Courts - A Discussion of the Decisions of the The District and Circuit Courts in Compassion in Dying v. Washington State by England, Elizabeth Gmyrek
Pace Law Review
Volume 16
Issue 2 Winter 1996
Tribute--Vincent L. Broderick
Article 12
January 1996
The Debate on Physician-Assisted Suicide Reaches
the Federal Courts - A Discussion of the Decisions
of the The District and Circuit Courts in
Compassion in Dying v. Washington State
Elizabeth Gmyrek England
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth Gmyrek England, The Debate on Physician-Assisted Suicide Reaches the Federal Courts - A
Discussion of the Decisions of the The District and Circuit Courts in Compassion in Dying v. Washington
State, 16 Pace L. Rev. 359 (1996)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol16/iss2/12
Note
The Debate on Physician-Assisted Suicide
Reaches the Federal Courts. A Discussion
of the Decisions of the District and Circuit
Courts in Compassion in Dying v.
Washington State. 1
I. Introduction
In Compassion in Dying v. Washington State,2 the issue of
whether a mentally competent, terminally ill person has a con-
stitutional right to commit physician-assisted suicide was
before a federal court for the first time. 3 The plaintiffs chal-
lenged the Washington State statute that prohibited assisted
suicide as violative of the Due Process 4 and Equal Protection 5
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the statute applied
to mentally competent, terminally ill patients within the con-
text of physician-assisted suicide.6 The United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington held that a men-
tally competent, terminally ill person has a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in the right to commit physician-assisted
suicide, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
1. 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995),
reh'g en banc granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1455.
4. "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1455. "A person is guilty of promot-
ing a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt
suicide." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 9A.36.060(1) (West 1988).
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Amendment. 7 Additionally, the district court held that the
Washington statute prohibiting physician-assisted suicide vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment by permitting patients dependent on life-sustaining
medical equipment to seek physician aid in ending their lives
through removal of the equipment, but prohibiting similarly sit-
uated mentally competent, terminally ill patients from seeking
physician aid in ending their lives through other means which
amount to physician-assisted suicide.8
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit con-
sidered the issue as one of first impression in a federal appellate
court,9 and that court reversed the judgment of the district
court.10 The circuit court held that the Washington statute to-
tally proscribing assisted suicide did not violate the constitu-
tional rights of mentally competent, terminally ill patients."
The issue in Compassion in Dying was the constitutionality
of physician-assisted suicide, not euthanasia. 12 Physician-as-
sisted suicide is distinguishable from euthanasia. 13 The pri-
mary distinction is the level of participation by the physician in
the death of the patient. 14 Euthanasia results when the physi-
cian actually administers a lethal agent to a patient, 5 while
7. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1462.
8. Id. at 1467. Washington State has, through case law and statutory law,
recognized the rights of mentally competent, terminally ill patients, and perma-
nently unconscious patients, whether or not terminally ill, to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment, or to have the treatment withdrawn. Id. at 1465-66 (citing In
re Grant, 747 P.2d 445 (Wash. 1987)(en banc); In re Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372 (Wash.
1984)(en banc). See also id. at 1466, n.11 (citing In re Bowman, 617 P.2d 731
(Wash. 1980); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983)); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 70.
122. 010 (West 1992 & West Supp. 1996).
9. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g en
bane granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995).
10. Id. at 588.
11. Id.
12. See generally id.; see generally also Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp.
1454.
13. See John Glasson, M.D., Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs of the American Medical Association; Transcript, 10 IssuEs LAw AND MED.
91, 92 (1994).
14. E.g., David Orentlicher, M.D., JD, Physician Participation in Assisted Sui-
cide, 262 JAMA 1844, 1844 (1989).
15. Glasson, supra note 13, at 92. Euthanasia may be further described as
voluntary, involuntary and nonvoluntary euthanasia. Council Report of the Coun-
cil on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Decisions Near
the End of Life, 267 JAMA 2229, 2229 (1992) [hereinafter Council Report]. Volun-
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physician-assisted suicide results when the physician merely
supplies a patient with sufficient means or information to com-
mit suicide, and the patient administers the drug or performs
the death-causing act herself.16 Euthanasia and physician-as-
sisted suicide are further distinguishable from the acts of with-
holding or withdrawing life sustaining medical treatment. 17
The act of withholding medical treatment occurs when the phy-
sician, at the request of the patient or a surrogate deci-
sionmaker, refrains from administering the treatment; and the
act of withdrawing medical treatment occurs when the physi-
cian, at the request of the patient or a surrogate decisionmaker,
discontinues administration of the treatment. 8 Unlike physi-
cian-assisted suicide and euthanasia, the acts of withholding
and withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment from com-
petent patients, and in some instances incompetent patients,
are accepted and considered ethical by the American Medical
Association,' 9 and have been approved by many courts.20
This casenote examines the decisions of both the district
and circuit courts in Compassion in Dying v. Washington to de-
termine whether either of the decisions is a logical extension of
current law, whether either of the decisions provides a sound
argument for other courts to follow, and whether, based on
these determinations, the circuit court was correct in overruling
the decision of the district court. Section II provides an expla-
nation of the current state of the law regarding physician-as-
sisted suicide. It also provides a background of the current
tary euthanasia occurs when a physician administers a lethal drug to a competent
patient, at the patient's request. Id. Involuntary euthanasia occurs when a physi-
cian administers a lethal drug to an incompetent patient, without the consent of
the patient. Id. Nonvoluntary euthanasia occurs when a physician administers a
lethal drug to an incompetent patient, at the direction of a surrogate deci-
sionmaker. Id.
16. Glasson, supra note 13, at 92.
17. Id.
18. Council Report, supra note 15, at 2230-31. Life-sustaining medical treat-
ment is defined as "any medical treatment that serves to prolong life without re-
versing the underlying medical condition. [It] may include, but is not limited to,
mechanical ventilation, renal dialysis, chemotherapy, antibiotics, and artificial nu-
trition and hydration." Id. at 2229.
19. Id. at 2230-31.
20. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 412-13 n.4 (Mo. 1988) (en banc),
aff'd, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). See also infra
notes 132-90 and accompanying text.
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medical, societal, and legal attitudes about, and trends relevant
to, physician-assisted suicide. Finally, section II discusses the
relevant constitutional jurisprudence surrounding the issue of
physician-assisted suicide, including cases dealing with the
right to privacy and cases dealing with equal protection. Sec-
tion III provides a summary of the facts and the decisions of
both the district and circuit courts in Compassion in Dying.
Section IV provides an analysis of the decisions of both the dis-
trict and circuit courts in Compassion in Dying. Section V con-
cludes that the decision of the district court in Compassion in
Dying is a sound decision that is a logical extension of current
law, and that is bound to lead the nation's courts in finding that
physician-assisted suicide is constitutionally protected for men-
tally competent, terminally ill patients. Section V further con-
cludes that the circuit court should not have overruled the
decision of the district court, and that the decision of the circuit
court, although currently the prevailing law in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, is short sighted and grounded in the moral attitudes of the
prevailing majority judges. The decision of the circuit court
does not thoroughly or accurately consider the relevant consti-
tutional jurisprudence surrounding the issue of physician-as-
sisted suicide, and thus, the circuit court did not arrive at a just
and logical decision.
II. Background
A. Current State of the Law Regarding Physician-Assisted
Suicide
The district court's decision in Compassion in Dying is sig-
nificant because it opened a door, although briefly, to a right
that was previously not legally recognized in this country.21
Although the circuit court closed this door, by reversing the dis-
21. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1459, 1467. Although the Michigan
Circuit Court previously held that a statute prohibiting assisted suicide violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that holding was overruled
on appeal. People v. Kevorkian, No. 93-11482, 1993 WL 603212 (Mich. Cir. Ct.,
Dec. 13, 1993), rev'd sub nom., Hobbins v. Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d 487
(Mich. App. 1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714
(Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995); see also infra note 24.
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trict court,22 the decision of the district court demonstrated a
willingness, by some members of the judiciary, to recognize the
right to commit physician-assisted suicide as a constitutionally
protected right.23 Prior to the district court's decision in Com-
passion in Dying, the right to commit physician-assisted suicide
was not recognized in this country by any legislative body or
level of the judiciary. 24 In fact, physician-assisted suicide is
statutorily prohibited in a majority of states. 25 Several states
22. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1995),
reh'g en banc granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995).
23. See generally Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. 1454.
24. Prior to the district court's decision in Compassion in Dying there were no
federal court cases addressing the issue of physician-assisted suicide. However,
there were several state court decisions addressing the issue. See Donaldson v.
Lundgren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (2d Dist. 1992) (holding that a man suffering from a
terminal brain disease did not have a constitutional right to commit assisted sui-
cide). See also People v. Kevorkian, No. 93-11482, 1993 WL 603212 (Mich. Cir. Ct.,
Dec. 13, 1993), rev'd sub nom. Hobbins v. Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714
(Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1795 (1995)(holding that a Michigan statute
prohibiting assisted suicide violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, by infringing on an individual's right to commit "rational suicide."
Id. at *20. The court defined rational suicide as follows: "when a person's quality
of life is significantly impaired by a medical condition and the medical condition is
extremely unlikely to improve, and that person's decision to commit suicide is a
reasonable response to the condition causing the quality of life to be significantly
impaired, and the decision to end one's life is freely made without undue influence
.... " Id. at *19. On appeal, this case was reversed on this point. Hobbins v.
Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994) (holding that there is no
constitutional right to commit physician-assisted suicide). Subsequent to the dis-
trict court's decision in Compassion in Dying, the issue of physician-assisted sui-
cide came before the District Court for the Southern District of New York. Quill v.
Koppell, 870 F.Supp. 78, 84-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that mentally competent,
terminally ill patients do not have a constitutional right, under either the Due
Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to
commit physician-assisted suicide).
25. Timothy Egan, Federal Judge Says Ban on Suicide Aid is Unconstitu-
tional, N.Y. TIMEs, May 4, 1994, at Al, A24. See also Brief for Appellee at 1, 15 n.1
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995). See also ALASKA
STAT. § 11.41.120 (1989); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(A)(3)(1989); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-10-104 (Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1988); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18-3-104(1)(b) (West 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-56 (West
1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (1987 & Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08
(West 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-31 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-2.5 (Burns 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1988); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 204 (West 1983); 1992 MICH. PuB. AcTs 270 (West);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215 (West 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 147.091(W) (West
Supp. 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105
5
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have considered legalizing it, however.2 6 To date, Oregon is the
only state that has passed a statute legalizing physician-as-
sisted suicide.27 However, the Oregon law, which was passed in
the latter part of 1994 by public referendum, is yet to be
tested.28 Within weeks of the passage of the law, the United
States District Court for the District of Oregon issued a prelimi-
nary injunction, forbidding action under the law, until the con-
stitutional arguments surrounding the law and the issue of
physician-assisted suicide were heard and decided by that
court.29  After hearing the constitutional arguments and con-
sidering the issue, the court determined that the Oregon statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and that the statute was, therefore, unconstitutional. 30
(1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:4 (1986); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6 (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (Michie 1978); N.Y.
PENAL LAw §§ 120.30, 125.15(3), 125.25(1)(b) (McKinney 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-16-04 (Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,§§ 813-818 (West 1983); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2505 (1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-16-37 (1988); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (West 1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West
1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.12 (West 1982).
26. Dick Lehr, Physicians Face Wrenching Choices. Requests for Help in Dy-
ing Produce a Professional Crisis. Death and the Doctor's Hand, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 27, 1993, Metro, at 1, 6. Referendums to legalize physician-assisted suicide
have been narrowly defeated in California and Washington. Id. The state legisla-
tures in New Hampshire, Maine, and Iowa have considered passing bills legalizing
physician-assisted suicide, but have not yet done so. Id. Additionally, Connecticut
and Wisconsin are currently drafting legislation to legalize physician-assisted sui-
cide. Id. Studies were conducted by commissions set up in New York in 1985, and
in Michigan in 1992, to consider whether the laws on assisted suicide in each of
those respective states should be changed. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591-
92 (citing WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT. ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE
MEDICAL CoNTExT (1994); MICHIGAN COMMISSION ON DEATH AND DYING, FINAL RE-
PORT (1994).) Neither state's commission opted to legalize assisted suicide. Id. (cit-
ing WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT. ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL
CONTEXT (1994); MICHIGAN COMMISSION ON DEATH AND DYING, FINAL REPORT
(1994)).
27. Death With Dignity Act, 1995 Or. Laws Ch. 3 I.M. No. 16. See also David
Brown, Medical Community Still Divided on Oregon's Assisted Suicide Act, WASH.
POST, Nov. 13, 1994, at A20 (stating that the enactment of Oregon's "Death with
Dignity Act," Measure 16, which legalizes assisted suicide in Oregon, is unprece-
dented in this country).
28. See Lee v. State, 869 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Or. 1994).
29. Id. at 1491, 1493, 1502-03.
30. Lee v. State, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1437 (D. Or. 1995). The court stated that,
with respect to the Equal Protection Clause, "[l]egislation is presumed valid if a
classification drawn by a statute is rationally related to a legitimate state inter-
est." Id. at 1432 (citing Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981)). The court ex-
364
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To date, the pioneering efforts of the district court in Compas-
sion in Dying, and of the Oregon citizens who voted to legalize
physician-assisted suicide in Oregon, have had no direct impact
on the state of the law.31
B. Trends Relevant to and Attitudes About Physician-
Assisted Suicide
The legalization of physician-assisted suicide in the United
States is in accordance with current trends in the medical com-
munity.3 2 Although the American Medical Association has re-
jected the notion of physician-assisted suicide,33 and the
Hippocratic Oath forbids it,34 the fact is that many physicians,
plained that "[a] classification rationally furthers a state interest when there is
some fit between the disparate treatment and the legislative purpose." Id. (citing
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)). The court then listed the relevant
state interests connected with the statute legalizing physician-assisted suicide and
found that, the way the statute was drawn, it did not provide for adequate safe-
guards to both protect the class of persons falling within the statute and to satisfy
the relevant state interests. Id. The court concluded that "Measure 16 withholds
from terminally ill citizens the same protections from suicide that the majority
enjoys," and it "provides a means to commit suicide to a severely overinclusive
class.... The state interest and the disparate treatment are not rationally related
and Measure 16, therefore, violates the Constitution of the United States." Id. at
1438, 1437.
31. See generally Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.
1995), reh'g en banc granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995); see generally Lee, 891 F.
Supp. at 1429.
32. See Sidney H. Wanzer, M.D. et al., The Physician's Responsibility Toward
Hopelessly Ill Patients, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 844, 844, 847-48 (1989).
33. Glasson, supra note 13, at 91. "IT]he Council on Ethical and Judicial Af-
fairs [of the American Medical Association] has a long-standing policy opposing
euthanasia...." Id. The June 1977 report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs of the American Medical Association, stated that "mercy killing or eutha-
nasia - is contrary to public policy, medical tradition, and the most fundamental
measures of human value and worth." Id. (quoting REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON
ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (1977)). In
June 1988, the Council reaffirmed "its strong opposition to mercy killing." Id.
(quoting REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMERI-
CAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (1988)). The June 1991 report, Decisions near the End
of Life, was the first to specifically address the issue of physician-assisted suicide.
The 1991 report stated that physicians "must not... participate in assisted sui-
cide" because physician-assisted suicide is contrary to the role of a physician. Id.
(quoting REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMERI-
CAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DECISIONS NEAR THE END OF LIFE, (1991)).
34. See id. at 93. "[Plhysicians shall 'give no deadly drug to any, though it be
asked of them, nor will they counsel such.' "Id. (quoting the Hippocratic Oath). But
see, Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986) (Roth, P.J., concurring)
7
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at least to some degree, are in favor of physician-assisted sui-
cide.35 The recent reaffirmation by the American Medical Asso-
ciation of its policy against physician-assisted suicide was met
with strong dissent.36 In a 1993 survey conducted by the Ameri-
can Journal of Public Health, 89% of physicians and nurses sur-
veyed responded that they believed in prescribing medication to
ease the pain of a terminally ill patient, even if the medication
would also have the effect of hastening death.37 According to
surveys conducted by a Rollins College law professor, approxi-
mately 50% of American physicians admit to having helped a
terminally ill patient hasten death.38 Another survey, con-
ducted in Washington State, revealed that 53% of physicians
believe that physician-assisted suicide should be legal in certain
situations, and that 40% of physicians would be willing to aid a
patient in hastening death.39 Finally, it is considered ethically
acceptable in the medical community for a physician to admin-
ister increasing quantities of medication to a terminally ill pa-
tient, knowing that the medication may cause the death of the
patient.40 It is common practice for a physician to administer a
palliative treatment, such as a morphine drip,41 to a dying pa-
"[T]he original [Hippocratic] Oath also contained the phrase 'I will not give to a
woman an instrument to produce abortion....' Obviously, the [medical] profession
has already accommodated a deviation from that part of the oath." Id. at 308 (quot-
ing the original Hippocratic Oath); TIMOTHY E. QUILL, M.D., DEATH AND DIGNITY,
MAKING CHOICES AND TAKING CHARGE (1993) "Two overriding directives of the
[Hippocratic] Oath are to prolong the lives of patients and to minimize their suffer-
ing.... These... principles often find themselves in conflict with one another in
the treatment of the severely ill and the dying." Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
35. See, e.g., Larry Richardson, Dying With a Doctor's Help, WASH. POST,
Mar. 1, 1994, Health, at 4.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Patty Shillington, The Kevorkian Factor Two Views of Assisted Suicide A
Way to Help the Terminally Ill, or a 'Quick Fix' for an Intolerant Society?, MIAMI
HERALD, June 8, 1994, at 1E, 2E (citing the results of surveys conducted by Marvin
Newman, a legal ethics professor at Rollins College in Central Florida).
39. Brown, supra note 27, at A20.
40. Glasson, supra note 13, at 92; see also Thomas A. Preston, Killing Pain,
Ending Life, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1994, at A27. This is termed the "double effect."
Id.
41. Preston, supra note 40, at A27. A morphine drip is a "slow, continuous
injection of the painkiller into a vein [that] kill[s] the patient by slowly curtailing
her breathing." Id.
366 [Vol. 16:359
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tient.42 Some experts believe that "the morphine drip is... eu-
thanasia, hidden by the cosmetics of professional tradition and
language."43
The legalization of physician-assisted suicide is also gain-
ing support in the public arena.44 "Opinion polls in... America
find consistent majorities in support of assisted suicide-. . ."45
According to one study, conducted by the Boston Globe and the
Harvard School of Public Health, 64% of Americans believe that
a physician should be permitted to assist a terminally ill patient
in hastening death by administering a lethal injection.46 A sim-
ilar study indicated that 68% of Americans believe that "people
dying of an incurable painful disease should be allowed to end
their lives before the disease runs its course."47 Society's grow-
ing acceptance of physician-assisted suicide is also evidenced by
law enforcement trends.48 "In every situation where a physi-
cian has compassionately assisted a terminally ill person to
commit suicide, criminal charges have been dismissed or a ver-
42. Id.; see also Council Report, supra note 15, at 2229, 2231. "Approximately
6,000 deaths per day are in some way planned or indirectly assisted in the United
States, probably confined to the 'double effect' or pain-relieving medications, and to
discontinuing or not starting potentially life-prolonging treatments." QUILL, supra
note 34, at 159.
43. E.g., Preston, supra note 40, at A27. While the morphine drip is given
under the guise of wanting to alleviate pain, the real purpose for the drip is to
hasten death. This, however, is unspoken by physicians. "If I administer mor-
phine to a suffering and dying patient to relieve pain, I am legal and ethical; if I
say it is to end her life, I am illegal and unethical." Id. Contra, Glasson, supra note
13, at 92 (differentiating both physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia from "the
provision of a palliative treatment that may hasten the patients death ('double
effect')" and stating that the intent of the physician in administering the medica-
tion is to ease pain, although the medication may cause the side effect of depress-
ing the patient's breathing and eventually causing the patient's death).
44. Wanzer, supra note 32, at 844.
45. The Right to Die, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 1994, at 14. "Every public
opinion survey taken over the past forty years asking questions about physician-
assisted dying for the terminally ill has shown that a majority or Americans sup-
port the idea." QUILL, supra note 34, at 159.
46. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Euthanasia: Historical, Ethical, and Empiric Per-
spectives, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1890, 1898 (1994). This study went a step
beyond physician-assisted suicide to euthanasia, by inquiring about the desirabil-
ity of letting a physician actually administer the injection, instead of merely sup-
plying the death causing agent. Id.
47. Council Report, supra note 15, at 2229 (quoting Associated Press/Media
General. Poll No. 4. Richmond, VA: Media General; Feb. 1985).
48. Orentlicher, supra note 14, at 1844.
9
PACE LAW REVIEW
dict of not guilty found."49 While physician-assisted suicide is
statutorily prohibited in a majority of states, there have been
inordinately few cases where a physician has been prosecuted
for aiding a patient in committing suicide.50 In one such case,
Dr. Jack Kevorkian was tried for violating a Michigan statute
that makes assisted suicide a criminal offense, after he assisted
twenty patients in committing suicide. 51 However, the jury re-
fused to convict Dr. Kevorkian under the newly enacted law.52
In addition to following the general medical and societal
trends, the legalization of assisted suicide is a logical extension
of legal trends.53 First, most states have repealed statutes that
made it a criminal offense to commit suicide or to attempt to
commit suicide. 54 Second, there has been a significant increase
in cases involving a patient's right to refuse life-sustaining med-
ical treatment in recent years, due to advances in medical tech-
nology and the ability of health care providers to keep people
alive longer with different forms of medical equipment.55 Third,
a majority of states now have laws legitimizing advance direc-
49. QUILL, supra note 34, at 150.
50. Orentlicher, supra note 14, at 1844. A grand jury refused to issue an in-
dictment against Dr. Quill for charges of physician-assisted suicide. To Cease upon
the Midnight, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 1994 at 21, 22; QUILL, supra note 34, at
22. Dr. Quill was one of the first physicians in the United States to candidly admit
that he aided a dying patient in committing suicide by providing her with barbitu-
rates and advising her about the amount that would be necessary to commit sui-
cide. To Cease upon the Midnight, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 1994 at 21, 22; see
also Timothy E. Quill, M.D., A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 691, 691-94 (1991) reprinted in QUILL, supra note 34, at 9-16.
51. David Margolick, Jurors Acquit Dr. Kevorkian in Suicide Case, N.Y. TIMES
May 3, 1994 at Al. See also 1992 MICH. PUB. ACT 270 (West).
52. Margolick, supra note 51, at Al. "Dr. Kevorkian's acquittal sends a
message to prosecutors that juries in Michigan are not willing to convict a doctor
who helps a terminally ill person implement a decision to hasten inevitable death."
Id. (quoting Robert Sedler, professor of constitutional law, Wayne State
University).
53. See Wanzer, supra note 32, at 844.
54. E.g., W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw § 74, at 568-69
(1972). "In America today.., no penalty attaches to a successful suicide; but some
states which retain common law crimes nevertheless speak of suicide as a "crimi-
nal" or "unlawful" act though.., not strictly-speaking a crime.... No state has a
statute making successful suicide a crime." Id.
55. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990) (cit-
ing Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 412 n.4 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub
nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (collecting 54
reported decisions from 1976 through 1988)); see also Wanzer, supra note 32, at
844 (citing Adult Right to Die Case Citations. New York: Society for the Right to
[Vol. 16:359368
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tives, such as living wills, 56 and many states are considering
passing health care proxy laws.5 7 Finally, the courts have
slowly recognized a greater number of rights as being protected
as part of the right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 58 and some courts have found that
the right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment is one of
these protected privacy rights.59
Outside of the United States, the atmosphere surrounding
the issues of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia is sub-
stantially similar to that in the United States.60 Although the
practices of euthanasia and assisted suicide are not yet legal in
any country, there is currently a great amount of debate sur-
rounding these issues across the Western World, due to ad-
vances in medical technology.61 Public opinion polls in many
western countries have revealed that the citizens of those coun-
tries favor both euthanasia and assisted suicide in some circum-
stances.62 A recent ruling by Germany's constitutional court
permitted physicians to allow a terminally ill, comatose patient
to die, by withdrawal of her life support.63 Last year the Cana-
dian Medical Association voted by a narrow margin to maintain
its ban on both active euthanasia by physicians and physician-
assisted suicide.6 4 In the Netherlands, physician-assisted sui-
cide is practiced openly, 65 although both euthanasia and physi-
Die (1988) (stating that the courts have consistently upheld patients' rights to re-
fuse unwanted medical treatment in over 80 cases).
56. Wanzer, supra note 32, at 844. A living will is defined as "[a] document
which governs the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from an
individual in the event of an incurable or irreversible condition that will cause
death within a relatively short time, and when such person is no longer able to
make decisions regarding his or her medical treatment." BLAC's LAW DICTIONARY
1599 (6th ed. 1990).
57. QUILL, supra note 34, at 194.
58. See Elizabeth Gleicher, Legalized Physician-assisted Suicide, 73 MIcH.
B.J. 184, 186 (1994); see also infra notes 72-131 and accompanying text.
59. E.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
60. See To Cease upon the Midnight, supra note 50, at 21.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 23.
63. Id. at 21; see also The Right to Die, supra note 45, at 14.
64. To Cease upon the Midnight, supra note 50, at 23.
65. E.g., Richard W. Carlson, M.D., PhD & Mohammed S. Anwar M.D., Wis-
consin Physicians and Euthanasia, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 501, 501 (Mar.
1994).
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cian-assisted suicide are technically illegal.6 6 "[T]here has been
tacit agreement for nearly two decades not to prosecute physi-
cians who assist their patients to die under certain conditions of
guidelines."67 In early 1993 these guidelines 68 were approved by
one chamber of the Dutch Parliament, and if they are approved
by the other chamber, they will become law.69 Of course, there
are arguments both for and against the Dutch system, some
claiming that too many old, sick, unwanted people are
euthanized against their will,70 and some claiming that people
are allowed to avoid unendurable suffering and to maintain
their dignity by having the right to choose to die before they lose
control of their physical capabilities and their mental
faculties.71
66. Lonnie R. Bristow, M.D., Report of the Board of Trustees of the American
Medical Association; Transcript, 10 ISSUES LAW & MED. 81, 83 (1994) (citing Arti-
cles 293 and 294 of the Dutch Penal Code).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 83-84. A summary of the substantive and procedural guidelines
which must be followed by physicians in the Netherlands before assisting a patient
in committing suicide are as follows:
Substantive Guidelines (a) Euthanasia must be voluntary; the patient's re-
quest must be seriously considered and enduring. (b) The patient must
have adequate information about his or her medical condition, the progno-
sis, and alternative methods of treatment (though it is not required that the
patient be terminally ill). (c) The patient's suffering must be intolerable, in
the patient's view, and must also be irreversible. (d) There must be no rea-
sonable alternatives for relieving the patient's suffering that are acceptable
to the patient. Procedural Guidelines (e) Euthanasia may be performed only
by a physician (though a nurse may assist the physician). (f) The physician
must consult with a second physician whose judgment can be expected to be
independent. (g) The physician must exercise due care in reviewing and
verifying the patient's condition as well as in performing the euthanasia
procedure itself. (h) The relatives must be informed unless the patient does
not wish this. (i) There should be a written record of the case. (j) The case
may not be reported as a natural death.
Id. (quoting M.P. Battin, A Dozen Caveats Concerning the Discussion of Euthana-
sia in the Netherlands, in THE LEAST WORST DEATH 130 (1994)).
69. Id. at 84.
70. Stephen Chapman, Where the Road to Assisted Suicide is Bound to Lead
Us, Cm. Tiu., Apr. 24, 1994, Perspective, at 3.
71. See Gerrit van der Was & Robert J.M. Dillman, Euthanasia in the Nether-
lands, 308 BRIT. MED. J. 1364, 1364 (1994).
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C. Privacy Cases
There is no right of privacy explicitly stated in the Consti-
tution.72 However, the United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized a right of personal privacy, which protects the individual's
right to self-determination, as implicit in the Constitution.73
The Court, or individual justices, have found, at various times
and in various circumstances, that the right of privacy may be
derived from the First Amendment, 74 the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, 75 the Bill of Rights,76 the Ninth Amendment, 77
and the Fourteenth Amendment.78 The Court has slowly and
continuously taken an expansive view of which rights it recog-
nizes as being privacy rights embraced by constitutional protec-
tion.79 In order for a right to come within the realm of protected
72. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
73. Id.
74. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); U.S. CONST. amend. I states:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." Id.
75. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
350 (1967); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); U.S. CONST. amend. IV
states: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... Id.;
U.S. CONST. amend. V states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases aris-
ing in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
Id.
76. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). See infra notes 66-
79 and accompanying text. See also U.S. CONST. amend. I-YX
77. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring); U.S. CONST. amend.
IX states: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Id.
78. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV states: "No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law ... ." Id. (emphasis added).
79. Gleicher, supra note 58, at 186.
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personal privacy, it must be a right that the Supreme Court
deems "'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty.' 80 Various rights which the Court has deemed "funda-
mental," and has therefore held to fall under constitutional
protection as personal privacy rights, are the right to use con-
traceptives,8 ' the right of a woman to obtain an abortion,8 2 the
right to make decisions about bodily integrity,8 3 and the right to
make decisions in many areas concerning the family, such as
marital relations,8 4 family relations,8 5 procreation,8 6 and child
rearing and education. 7
1. Right to use contraceptives
In 1965 the Supreme Court held, in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut,8 8 that the right to use contraceptives was a constitutionally
protected privacy right that inheres in a married couple.8 9 In
Griswold, the defendants, directors of Planned Parenthood,
gave information to married couples about birth control, ex-
amined the wives, and prescribed a method of birth control for
the wives to use.90 The defendants were prosecuted and con-
victed under two Connecticut statutes. 91 The first made it ille-
gal for any person to use a contraceptive to prevent
conception,92 and the other made it illegal for any person to as-
80. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
81. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). See infra notes 88-102
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Griswold decision. See also Carey v.
Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 at 685-86 (1977).
82. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
83. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (holding that inmates
had a privacy interest in being free from involuntary administration of psycho-
tropic drugs).
84. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). See infra notes 222-37 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of the Loving decision.
85. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
86. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
87. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1922).
88. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
89. Id. at 485-86.
90. Id. at 480.
91. Id.
92. Id. "Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for
the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined ... ." Id. (quoting CoNN. GEN.
STAT. § 53-32 (1958)).
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sist, counsel, or cause another to commit any offense.93 The de-
fendants appealed, challenging the constitutionality of both
statutes.94
The Court held that the statute forbidding the use of con-
traceptives to prevent conception unconstitutionally intruded
upon the right of marital privacy.95 In reaching this decision,
the Court explained that certain guarantees of the Bill of Rights
have penumbras emanating from the guarantees and helping to
give them substance.96 The Court reasoned that these constitu-
tional guarantees create particular "zones of privacy,"97 which
protect an individual within them from being subjected to
overly intrusive government intervention. 9 The government
may regulate an activity that falls within these "zones of pri-
vacy," but it may not invade so much as to obstruct a protected
freedom.99 The Court held that marriage falls within these
"zones of privacy," and therefore, the government must respect
the rights of married individuals to make marital decisions,
such as using contraceptives to avoid conception. 100
A majority of the Court in Griswold held that the right of
privacy stemmed from the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, 10
93. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480 "Any person who assists, abets, counsels,
causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and
punished as if he were the principle offender." Id. (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-
196 (1958)).
94. Id. at 480-81.
95. Id. at 485-86.
96. Id.
97. Id.
The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment
is [a zone of privacy].... The Third Amendment in its prohibition against
the quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in time of peace without the consent
of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment ex-
plicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a
zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his
detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Con-
stitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.'
Id. at 484.
98. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 485-86.
101. Id. at 484-85.
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and not from the Fourteenth Amendment. Several justices con-
curred in the opinion, agreeing that marriage fell within the
right of privacy, which was constitutionally protected, but argu-
ing that the right of privacy stemmed from different individual
constitutional amendments. 0 2
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court decided Eisen-
stadt v. Baird.0 3 Eisenstadt extended the right to use contra-
ceptives, as stated in Griswold, from married couples to all
individuals, on the basis of equal protection. 0 4 In addition to
its equal protection analysis in Eisenstadt, the Court also noted
that "[i]f the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting
a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 0 5
2. Right to obtain an abortion
In Roe v. Wade,'06 the United States Supreme Court held
that a woman has a constitutionally protected privacy right to
obtain an abortion. 0 7 The Court has consistently reaffirmed
that holding in later cases. 08 The most recent Supreme Court
102. Id. at 486-500 (Goldberg, J., concurring)(arguing that the right to privacy
at issue in the case stemmed from the Ninth Amendment); id. at 500-02 (Harlan,
J., concurring) (arguing that the right to privacy at issue in the case stemmed from
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
103. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
104. Id. at 443.
105. Id. at 453-54 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)).
See infra notes 196-221 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Eisenstadt
decision.
106. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
107. Id. at 153.
108. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 420 (1983)
overruled in part by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2816-17, 2823
(1992); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 759 (1986) overruled in part by Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816-17, 2823. Casey
overruled Akron I and Thornburgh only to the extent that those cases were incon-
sistent with the statement in Roe that the State has legitimate interests in the
potential life of the fetus. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816-17. The Casey Court held con-
stitutional certain pre-viability measures taken by the State to further its inter-
ests in fetal life, which Akron I and Thornburgh deemed unconstitutional. Id. at
2823. The Casey Court noted, however, that the "central premise of those cases
represents an unbroken commitment by [the] Court to the essential holding of
Roe." Id.; Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (where a ma-
jority of the court reaffirmed or did not address the basic holding in Roe v. Wade).
374
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decision to reaffirm the essential holding of Roe v. Wade was
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.10 9
In Casey, the Court was asked to overrule Roe. 110 In declin-
ing to do so, the Court held that a woman has a protected lib-
erty interest in obtaining an abortion, before the fetus is viable,
without undue interference from the state."' The Court deter-
mined that this right "derives from the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."" 2 The Court realized that abor-
tion is an emotionally-charged issue about which many people
disagree, due to differences in moral and religious ideals.
13
The Court refused to mandate its own moral agenda, however,
stating that "[its] obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to
mandate [its] own moral code."" 14
The Court explained that there is a "realm of personal lib-
erty" 115 inherent in the United States Constitution that limits
the states' interference in the lives and decisions of individu-
als. 1 6 The outer limits of this protected "realm of personal lib-
erty" have not yet been defined. 1" 7 The Court has thus far held
that this "realm of personal liberty" protects "personal decisions
'relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela-
tionships, and child rearing and education.'"118 Additionally,
the state may not unduly interfere with personal decisions
about bodily integrity. 1 9 These personal decisions are constitu-
tionally protected because:
[t]hese matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dig-
nity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to de-
109. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992).
110. Id. at 2803.
111. Id. at 2804.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2806.
114. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806.
115. Id. at 2805.
116. Id. at 2805-06.
117. Id. at 2811 (citing Carey v. Population Serv. Intl, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85
(1977)).
118. Id. (quoting Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-85 (citations omitted)).
119. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806 (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
221-22 (1990); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952)).
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fine one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life.120
These liberties could not be attained by individuals if they were
forced to suffer undue interference from the state. 121
In the context of abortion, "the liberty of the woman is at
stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to
the law .... Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the
State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the wo-
man's role .... "1 22 "Roe ... may be seen ... as a rule . . . of
personal autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal affinity
to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate
medical treatment or to bar its rejection."1 In order for a wo-
man to remain autonomous, and to prevent her from suffering
undue interference from the state, the Court refused to overrule
the basic holding of Roe v. Wade. 124
The Casey Court explained that the right of a woman to
obtain an abortion is not an absolute right.125 The court stated
that this concept holds true with all liberty interests, and "not
every law which makes a right more difficult to exercise is, ipso
facto, an infringement of that right."126 The court noted that the
state interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus and the
life of the mother must be considered along with the interests of
the mother.127 "The very notion that the State has a substantial
interest in potential life leads to the conclusion that not all reg-
ulations must be deemed unwarranted.' 28 Consequently, a
statute which serves a valid purpose but has the incidental ef-
fect of limiting the right to obtain an abortion will stand, unless
it imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to exercise the
right. 129 The Court explained that a statute which creates an
"undue burden" is one which "placles] a substantial obstacle in
120. Id. at 2807.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2810.
124. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816-17.
125. Id. at 2819.
126. Id. at 2818 (citing as examples Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780
(1983); Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992) (holding that every limitation on ac-
cess to voting ballots is not an infringement on -the right to vote)).
127. Id. at 2820 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)).
128. Id.
129. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2819.
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the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fe-
tus." 130 The Court concluded that the undue burden standard is
the correct standard to apply in order to balance the interests of
the state with the constitutional rights of the woman.1 31
3. Right to refuse or withdraw life-sustaining medical
treatment
In recent years, the courts have been confronted with a
growing number of cases which require a determination of
whether a patient has the right to have life-sustaining medical
treatment withdrawn. 132 Courts that have faced the issue of a
patient's right to refuse medicaltreatment have dealt with the
issue differently, though most courts have reached the same
conclusion. 13 3 "Nearly unanimously, those courts have found a
way to allow persons wishing to die, or those who seek the death
of a ward, to meet the end sought."'3 Consistent with the ex-
pansion of constitutionally protected privacy rights in other per-
sonal areas, some courts have held that the Fourteenth
Amendment gives a patient a constitutionally protected privacy
right to refuse or discontinue medical treatment. 35 However,
other courts have held that a patient's right to refuse medical
treatment is derived from the common law doctrine of informed
consent. 3 6 Still other courts have held that the right to refuse
130. Id. at 2820.
131. Id.
132. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W. 2d 408, 412 n.4 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd
sub nom., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (listing
state court cases from 1979 to 1988 that dealt with the issue of removal of life-
sustaining machinery).
133. Id. at 413.
134. Id.
135. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (holding that a patient in a vegetative state with no
hope of recovery had a privacy right to discontinue life-sustaining medical equip-
ment, which was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment). See infra notes 142-
167 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Quinlan decision; See also,
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986) (discussing both the right of
privacy and the doctrine of informed consent, but holding that a patient who was
mentally competent and not terminally ill could elect to have life-sustaining medi-
cal equipment removed based solely on the constitutional right of privacy).
136. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990). The
doctrine of informed consent was described by Justice Cardozo as follows: "Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his
19
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medical treatment is derived from both the protected privacy
right of the Fourteenth Amendment and the common law doc-
trine of informed consent. 137 A majority of courts have based
the right to refuse medical treatment on either the common law
doctrine of informed consent or both the doctrine of informed
consent and a right to personal privacy. 38 The United States
Supreme Court confronted the issue in Cruzan v. Director, Mis-
souri Department of Health, where it stated that guardians of
an incompetent person could require discontinuation of life-sus-
taining medical treatment if they could prove, by evidence suffi-
cient to satisfy the state, that the incompetent person would
have required the treatment to be withdrawn, had she been
competent to make the decision. 139 In reaching this holding, the
Court briefly addressed the rights of mentally competent per-
sons to remove life-sustaining medical treatment. 140 It as-
sumed, for the purposes of Cruzan, that a mentally competent
person has a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to refuse or withdraw unwanted
medical treatment.141
In the seminal case In re Quinlan,142 the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that a person has a constitutionally pro-
tected right to discontinue medical treatment under certain
conditions, stemming from the constitutional right to privacy. 43
In that case, Karen Ann Quinlan stopped breathing for two 15
patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." Id. (quot-
ing Schloendorffv. Society of N.Y. Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914)); see infra notes 168-190 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Cruzan decision.
137. E.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Schs. v. Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977) (holding that the right of an elderly man to refuse chemo-
therapy was grounded in the constitutional right to privacy and the common law
right of informed consent).
138. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271 (citing LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrru-
TIONAL LAW § 15-11, 1365 (2d ed. 1988)).
139. Id. at 284.
140. Id. at 279.
141. Id. In Cruzan, the patient plaintiff was not mentally competent, id. at
265, and the question before the Court was whether a person who was not men-
tally competent had a constitutional right to have medical treatment withdrawn.
Id. at 269; see infra notes 168-190 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Cruzan decision.
142. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
143. Id. at 663.
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minute intervals, as a result of which she entered a "chronic
persistent vegetative state"144 and was unable to breathe with-
out a respirator.145 When there was no longer any hope that
Karen Ann would recover, 4 her father sought court approval to
have her life-sustaining medical treatment removed. 147 The
lower court denied the father's pleas and he appealed, claiming
that his daughter had a constitutional right to withdraw medi-
cal treatment.' 48
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that a person has a
constitutionally protected right to withdraw life-sustaining
medical treatment.149 In reaching the determination that this
right to withdraw medical treatment not only existed, but that
it was a constitutionally protected right, the court examined the
right to religious freedom, the right to protection against cruel
and unusual punishment, and the right of privacy. 150
The court first determined that the First Amendment right
to free exercise of religion did not mandate granting the relief
the plaintiff requested under the circumstances.' 5' "[T]he right
to religious beliefs is absolute but conduct in pursuance thereof
is not wholly immune from governmental restraint." -52 At least
under the circumstances of this case, where the religious belief
sought to be protected was truly religious "neutrality," 53 the
State's interest in preserving life must take precedence over
144. Id. at 654; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266-67 n.1. The Cruzan Court recognized
the definition of "vegetative state," as earlier stated by Dr. Fred Plum, who created
the term "persistent vegetative state," as follows:
Vegetative state describes a body which is functioning entirely in terms of
its internal controls. It maintains temperature. It maintains heart beat
and pulmonary ventilation. It maintains digestive activity. It maintains re-
flex activity of muscles and nerves for low level conditioned responses. But
there is no behavioral evidence of either self-awareness or awareness of the
surroundings in a learned manner.
Id. (quoting In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (1987)).
145. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 653-54.
146. Id. at 655.
147. Id. at 653.
148. Id. at 651, 653.
149. Id. at 664.
150. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 661-64.
151. Id. at 661.
152. Id. (citing John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 279 A.2d 670
(N.J. 1971)).
153. Id.
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freedom of religion.54 The court then determined that the
Eighth Amendment guarantee of protection against cruel and
unusual punishment was inapplicable because that guarantee
only applies to cases in which penal sanctions are imposed.155
Finally, the court examined the right to privacy. 56 The court
reasoned that this right, which is not explicitly stated in the
Constitution, but which the United States Supreme Court has
found to be implicit in the Constitution,157 is "[piresumably...
broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medi-
cal treatment under certain circumstances, in much the same
way as it is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to
terminate pregnancy under certain circumstances.' 58
The court, having found a right to privacy implicated by the
administration of unwanted medical treatment, determined
that a patient would normally have to be competent in order to
exercise this right to discontinue medical treatment. 59 How-
ever, the court allowed a guardian to assert the right of privacy
on behalf of the incompetent patient under the circumstances of
the case. 160 The court opined that allowing the guardian and
family to determine whether the incompetent patient would
want the life support removed under the circumstances, was the
"only practical way to prevent destruction of the right ....
The Quinlan court additionally addressed the aspects of the
physician's involvement in withdrawal of life-sustaining medi-
cal treatment.162 The court determined that a physician could
not be held criminally liable for withdrawing life-sustaining
medical treatment in circumstances similar to those in Quin-
lan. 63 The court so held, in part, because there is a difference
between homicide and the termination of life support. 1 4 Where
life support is terminated, death results from "natural
154. Id.
155. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 662.
156. Id. at 662-64.
157. Id. at 663. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)).
158. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)).
159. Id. at 664.
160. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 664-70.
163. Id. at 669.
164. Id. at 670.
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causes."165 Additionally, "the exercise of a constitutional right
... is protected from criminal prosecution."16 6 This protection
extends to third parties aiding a person in exercising her consti-
tutional rights. 6 7
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,'68
petitioner Nancy Cruzan was in a persistent vegetative state169
as a result of an automobile accident. 170 When it became clear
that there was no hope of Nancy recovering or regaining her
mental faculties, co-petitioners, her parents as guardians, re-
peatedly requested that her physicians remove her feeding and
hydration tubes.171 When Nancy Cruzan's physicians refused to
do so without court approval, co-petitioners sought court ap-
proval to have the tubes removed. 172 The Missouri Supreme
Court refused to approve the removal of Nancy's life-sustaining
medical equipment. 73 That court held that the co-petitioners
did not sufficiently prove that the patient would have removed
the medical equipment had she been competent to make the
choice. 74 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the judg-
ment of the Missouri Supreme Court, 75 holding that a state
may mandate, as a requirement for removal of life-sustaining
medical equipment, that the guardians of an incompetent per-
son prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the incompe-
tent person would have wanted life support removed. 7 6
165. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 670.
166. Id. (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969)).
167. Id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965)).
168. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
169. Id. at 266 n. 1 The Court reiterated the findings of the trial court, that
were adopted by the state Supreme Court, which stated in part: "Nancy is diag-
nosed as in a persistent vegetative state. She is not dead. She is not terminally ill.
Medical experts testified that she could live another thirty years." Id. (quoting
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W. 2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd, Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (quotations omitted; footnote
omitted)). See supra note 144 for the definition of "vegetative state."
170. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266.
171. Id. at 267.
172. Id. at 268.
173. Id. (citing Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408).
174. Id. (citing Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 424, 426).
175. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287.
176. Id. at 284.
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The United States Supreme Court assumed, for purposes of
this case, that a competent person has a liberty interest, under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to re-
fuse unwanted medical treatment.177 The Court stated that
"[t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treat-
ment may be inferred from [the Court's] prior decisions."17 The
Court rejected the petitioners' contention that the incompetent
person should have the same right as the competent person in
refusing life sustaining medical treatment, stating that this
claim "begs the question."179 The Court recognized that an in-
competent person is not capable of making "an informed and
voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical right to refuse treat-
ment .... Such a 'right' must be exercised for her, if at all, by
some sort of surrogate." 80 The Court noted that Missouri had
merely implemented a procedural safeguard to ensure protec-
tion of the incompetent person's rights,'8 ' and after considering
whether such a safeguard was constitutional, the Court deter-
mined that it was in accordance with the Constitution. 8 2
Once the Court has determined that a person has a consti-
tutionally protected liberty interest, it must consider further
"whether [his] constitutional rights have been violated . . . by
balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state inter-
ests."183 The State interests asserted in Cruzan were the inter-
ests in protecting and preserving life.184 Because of the
significant State interests implicated in dealing with the with-
drawal of the life support of an incompetent person, the Court
held that a State may adopt a clear and convincing evidence
standard of proof in order to protect these interests. 8 5 The
Court stated that "[i]t cannot be disputed that the Due Process
177. Id. at 279.
178. Id. at 278.
179. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279-80.
180. Id. at 280.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 279 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)).
184. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
185. Id. at 280-84.
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Clause protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refus-
ing life-sustaining medical treatment."186
Proceeding on the assumption made by the Court that a
competent person has a protected liberty interest in removing
life support, Nancy Cruzan would have been legally permitted
to request removal of her feeding tubes if she were competent. 8 7
However, because Nancy Cruzan was incompetent, her guardi-
ans could be required by the State to prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence that she would have made the decision to
disconnect the life support, had she been competent to make
such a decision. 88 This, the guardians failed to do.189 There-
fore, the State was permitted to refuse to grant her guardians
permission to request removal of life support on her behalf.190
D. Equal Protection Cases
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment' 9'
does not disallow states from treating different classes of per-
sons differently, or from devising classifications of persons when
drafting legislation. 92 However, the Equal Protection Clause
does require that all persons similarly situated be treated the
same.' 93 "[A] classification [drawn by a state] must be reason-
able, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of differ-
186. Id. at 281.
187. See id. at 278-79.
188. Id. at 284.
189. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 285.
190. Id. After the decision of the United States Supreme Court was handed
down in Cruzan, Nancy Cruzan's parents requested a new hearing in the Jasper
County Probate Court. Malcolm Gladwell, Court Rules Woman has Right to Die;
Cruzan Case Leaves Unresolved Issues, Legal Experts Say, WASH. PosT, Dec. 15,
1990, at Al, A10. That court granted the new hearing and, after conclusion of the
hearing, the court granted Nancy Cruzan's parents the right to require that her
feeding tube be removed. Anger in Hospital at a Death Order, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
1990, at 29. Cruzan's feeding tube was removed by her physician later that day.
Id.
191. "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
192. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27,
31-32 (1885); McDonald v. Bd. of Election Conm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 808-09 (1969);
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
193. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1972) (citing Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971)).
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ence having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
legislation . *.".."194 The Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment
undoubtedly intended ... that equal protection and security
should be given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment
of their personal and civil rights;... that no impediment should
be interposed to the pursuits of any one except as applied to the
same pursuits by others under like circumstances; [and] that no
greater burdens should be laid upon one than are laid upon others
in the same calling and condition .... 195
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,196 appellee Baird gave lectures at
various colleges, at which he displayed different kinds of contra-
ceptives. 197 During the course of one such lecture at Boston Col-
lege, Baird exhibited contraceptives to his audience of college
students, and at the end of the lecture, he gave out a sample of
contraceptive foam to an unmarried woman. 198 He was con-
victed by the trial court for violating Massachusetts law, both
by displaying the articles, and by giving out the sample of con-
traceptive foam.199 The statute under which he was convicted
made it unlawful for any person to "give[ ] away... any drug,
medicine, instrument, or article whatever for the prevention of
conception"200 except that a physician, or a pharmacist with a
prescription from a physician, may give these things to a mar-
ried person.201 The statute clearly distinguished between three
classes of persons: "first, married persons may obtain contra-
ceptives to prevent pregnancy, but only from doctors or drug-
gists on prescription; second, single persons may not obtain
contraceptives from anyone to prevent pregnancy; and, third,
married or single persons may obtain contraceptives from any-
one to prevent, not pregnancy, but the spread of disease."20 2
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts upheld Baird's conviction
194. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
195. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
196. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
197. Id. at 440.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 440-41 (citing MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 21 (West 1990)).
201. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 441 (citing MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 21A
(West 1990)).
202. Id. at 442.
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based solely on his action of giving out a sample of contraceptive
foam.20 3 Baird later filed an action in the district court for a
writ of habeas corpus, which that court dismissed,2 4 but the
First Circuit subsequently ordered that the writ be granted. 205
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to de-
termine whether there was a rational basis for maintaining a
distinction between married and unmarried persons that would
justify the different treatment afforded to each group under
Massachusetts law.206 The Court explained that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause does not forbid the government from treating
people differently when those people are not similarly situ-
ated. 20 7 However, the Equal Protection Clause does forbid the
government from treating different classes of people differently
when the disparate treatment is based solely on arbitrary dis-
tinctions.208 "A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' "209
In determining whether there was a rational basis for the
distinctions made under the Massachusetts statute, the Court
first examined the purported state interests in enforcing the
statute. 210 The Court determined that, contrary to the claims of
the State, the purpose of the statute was not to discourage pre-
marital sex, because the overall effect of the statute would be to
punish the act of premarital sex with pregnancy.211 The Court
also refused to accept the state court's determination that the
statute was a health measure intended to protect the health
and safety of Massachusetts citizens, because it was shown that
203. Id. at 440 (citing Commonwealth v. Baird, 247 N.E.2d 574 (Mass. 1969)).
204. Id. (citing Baird v. Eisenstadt, 310 F. Supp. 951 (D. Mass 1970)).
205. Id. (citing Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398 (1st Cir. 1970)).
206. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447.
207. Id. at 446-47 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971); Barbier v.
Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61
(1911); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); McDonald v.
Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969)).
208. Id. at 447 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-6 (1971)).
209. Id. (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
210. Id. at 448.
211. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 448.
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the State did not have this purpose in mind when the statute
was enacted.212
The Court determined that there was no rational difference
between married persons and unmarried persons that would
justify the different treatment given to them under the stat-
ute.213 It stated that "whatever the rights of the individual to
access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for
the unmarried and the married alike."214 The Court declined to
determine whether the statute could be upheld solely as a pro-
hibition of contraceptives. 215 This question rested on the deter-
mination of whether Griswold v. Connecticut 21 6 prohibited a ban
on the distribution of contraceptives to married persons.217 The
Court determined that whether or not Griswold prohibited a
ban on the distribution of contraceptives to married persons,
the Equal Protection Clause requires that married persons and
single persons be treated alike.218 To allow one group (either
married or single) access to contraceptives to prevent concep-
tion, while not allowing the other group that same right, would
violate the Equal Protection Clause because, "[i]n each case the
evil, as perceived by the State, would be identical, and the un-
derinclusion would be invidious."219 Finally, the Eisenstadt
Court quoted Mr. Justice Jackson, stating that his comments
made in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 220 although made
212. Id. at 450.
213. Id. at 447. The requirement that the statutory classification be merely
rationally related to a valid state interest for the statute to be valid is the equal
protection standard. Id. at 447 n.7. If the Court had concluded that the statute
infringed on a fundamental right, then it would have applied a more stringent
standard, requiring a compelling state interest for the classification to pass scru-
tiny. Id. (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967)). However, the Court determined that application of the stricter stan-
dard was not required in this case because the statute failed to meet even this
more lenient equal protection standard. Id. (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971)).
214. Id. at 453.
215. Id. at 452-53.
216. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See supra notes 88-102 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Griswold decision.
217. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 452-53.
218. Id. at 453-54.
219. Id. at 454.
220. 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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in the context of administrative regulations, equally applied to
the context of contraception:
The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget
today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against
arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the
principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority
must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to
arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and
choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to
escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if
larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure
to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal
in operation.221
In Loving v. Virginia,222 the Supreme Court considered
whether a Virginia statutory scheme implemented to prevent
marriages between persons on the basis of racial classifications
was a violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 22 Defendants, an in-
terracial couple who were Virginia residents, were married in
Washington D.C. 224 Subsequent to their marriage, defendants
returned to Virginia to live, violating Virginia law, and were
convicted under two statutes.225 These statutes made it a crime
for "any white person and colored person"22 to marry outside
the state and return to Virginia to live as husband and wife. 227
The punishment for violating the statutes was the same for any
person, regardless of race.2 2
The United States Supreme Court struck down the Virginia
statutory scheme as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 229 The Court recognized that
marriage was a social institution subject to the state's police
power, but explained that the State was nonetheless limited by
the Fourteenth Amendment in its power to regulate mar-
221. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454 (quoting Railway Express Agency v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
222. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
223. Id. at 2.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 2-4.
226. Id. at 4.
227. Loving, 388 U.S. at 4.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 2.
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riage.230 The State did not argue with this limitation.231 In-
stead, the main argument of the State was that the statutory
scheme did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment because it punished both whites and blacks
equally under the statutes.23 2 The State argued that the stat-
utes should therefore be upheld, as long as they served a ra-
tional basis.23 The Court answered this argument by stating:
[blecause we reject the notion that the mere "equal application" of
a statute containing racial classifications is enough to remove the
classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of
all invidious racial discriminations, we do not accept the State's
contention that these statutes should be upheld if there is any
possible basis for concluding that they serve a rational purpose.234
The Court determined that the challenged miscegenation
statutes were drawn solely on racial distinctions, and that
therefore, strict scrutiny must be applied to the statutes.2
35
Therefore, the statutes could only stand if there was a permissi-
ble state interest served by the classification other than racial
discrimination. 236 The Court found no such permissible interest
served by the statutes, and thus, it held the statutes to be a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 237
230. Id. at 7.
231. Id.
232. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7-8.
233. Id. at 8.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 11.
236. Id.
237. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12.
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III. Compassion in Dying v. Washington
A. Facts
Jane Roe is dying of cancer.23 8 She is an elderly, retired
physician who has suffered with cancer for the past six years. 23 9
She is in constant pain, she is bedridden and weak, her legs are
swollen, and she can no longer eat without feeling nauseous or
vomiting.240 She has been treated with chemotherapy and radi-
ation, but there is no longer any hope that she will recover.241
She is terminally ill and her constant pain can no longer be ef-
fectively alleviated with drugs. 242
John Doe is dying of AIDS. 243 His illness was diagnosed in
1991 and he is now terminally ill.244 He suffers tremendously
with symptoms of AIDS, including seizures, pneumonia, sinus
and skin infections, and loss of eyesight.245
James Poe is dying of emphysema.24 Mr. Poe is an elderly
man who constantly suffers from a feeling of suffocation which
causes him to panic.247 He is continuously administered oxygen
to aid his breathing and morphine to calm his sense of panic. 24
His disease has caused him to experience heart failure and ex-
treme pain in his legs.249
These three patients are all mentally competent and termi-
nally ill, and they all wish to hasten their deaths through the
238. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1456 (W.D.
Wash. 1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g en banc granted, 62 F.3d 299
(9th Cir. 1995). All plaintiff patients utilized pseudonyms in connection with the
case to preserve their privacy. Id. at 1456 n.2. Jane Roe died before judgment was
rendered by the district court in Compassion in Dying. Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 593 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g en banc granted, 62 F.3d 299
(9th Cir. 1995).
239. Compassion in Dying, 850 F.Supp. at 1456.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. John Doe died before judgment was rendered by the district court in
Compassion in Dying. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 593.
244. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1456.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1457. James Poe died after the district court's judgment was ren-
dered in Compassion in Dying, while the case was pending appeal. Compassion in
Dying, 49 F.3d at 593.
247. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1457.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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use of prescription drugs. 250 All three want their physicians to
assist them in dying by prescribing the drugs necessary to
hasten their deaths.251 Jane Roe also wishes to enlist the help
of plaintiff Compassion in Dying.252
250. Id. at 1456-57.
251. Id.
252. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1456. Compassion in Dying is an
organization which provides assistance and counseling to terminally ill, mentally
competent adults who wish to commit physician-assisted suicide. Id. Compassion
in Dying adheres to strict guidelines and safeguards in providing assistance to
patients. The following is a list of the guideline areas and specific requirements
that must be met in each area in order for the patient to receive assistance from
Compassion in Dying. 1) Eligibility: a patient must be an adult who is mentally
competent and terminally ill, her condition must cause severe, intolerable suffer-
ing, she must understand her condition, her prognosis, and the different alterna-
tives available to her, and a second physician must examine the patient and
consult with the patient's primary physician to verify eligibility; 2) quality of care:
a request for hastened death must not arise from inadequate comfort care, eco-
nomic concerns, or lack of health care; 3) process of requesting assistance: re-
quests for assistance must be confidential and arise from the patient, any
indication of uncertainty by the patient making the request results in cancellation
of the process, and requests must be made at the time assistance is desired, and
not through advance directives; 4) mental health considerations: the patient may
be required to undergo an evaluation of a professional in order to rule out emo-
tional distress and the patient must understand the decision to hasten death and
take responsibility for the decision; and 5) family and religious considerations: the
family of the patient must give approval and spiritual or emotional counseling may
be arranged for the family. Compassion and Dying Executive Director's Report at
4 (on file with author).
In addition to these guidelines, Compassion also has specific standards that
serve as safeguards. The safeguards include:
* Patient must provide three signed written requests.
* There must be a 48-hour waiting period between the second and third
requests.
* COMPASSION representatives meet in-person with patient and family.
* Terminal prognosis and patient's decision-making capacity are verified by
an independent physician.
* Physician may call for evaluation by a qualified mental health
professional.
* Physician ascertains that request for assistance does not result from inad-
equate care or pain management.
* Any sign of indecision on the part of the patient, or opposition by the im-
mediate family, cancels the process.
* Lead contact person is appointed as part of the team to review case and
alternatives.
* Review team meets regularly to confirm eligibility and if assistance is
warranted.
* The patient may request that COMPASSION be present at the time of death.
* Actual means of hastening death is prescribed by patient's physician and
varies according to underlying condition.
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B. Procedure
Jane Roe, John Doe, and James Poe commenced action in
the United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, along with five physicians and Compassion in Dy-
ing,253 to challenge the constitutionality of a Washington State
statute254 which made physician-assisted suicide a criminal of-
fense.255 All plaintiffs claimed that the statute violated the due
process rights and equal protection rights of mentally compe-
tent, terminally ill patients to commit physician-assisted sui-
cide. 256 The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the
statute only as it applied to mentally competent, terminally ill
adults. 257
In addition to the general claim asserted by all plaintiffs,
each group of plaintiffs promulgated their individual arguments
based on their particular situations.25 The plaintiff patients
asserted that they, as mentally competent, terminally ill pa-
tients, had the constitutional right to commit physician-assisted
suicide.259 The plaintiff physicians, in addition to asserting the
constitutional right to commit physician-assisted suicide on be-
half of their patients, also argued that they, as physicians, had
the constitutional right to "practice medicine consistent with
their best professional judgment."260 Plaintiff Compassion in
Dying asserted that mentally competent, terminally ill patients,
such as the patient plaintiffs in this case, had a constitutional
right to seek the aid of Compassion in Dying in committing phy-
sician-assisted suicide. 261 Compassion in Dying feared that it
* If requested, ongoing emotional support will be provided for survivors.
* To maintain dignity, patient's identity will not be disclosed.
Id.
253. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1456-57.
254. WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 9A.36.060(1) provides: "A person is guilty of pro-
moting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to at-
tempt suicide." WASH. Rnv. CODE ANN § 9A.36.060(2) provides: "Promoting a
suicide attempt is a class C felony." WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 9A.36.060 (West
1988).
255. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1455-56.
256. Id. at 1456.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1459.
259. Id.
260. Compassion In Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1459.
261. Id.
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might be criminally prosecuted for assisting such persons in
committing physician-assisted suicide.262
The district court held that the Washington statute vio-
lated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 263 The State of Washington appealed
from the decision of the district court.26 4
C. The Decision of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington
The District Court for the Western District of Washington
held that the Washington statute prohibiting physician-as-
sisted suicide infringed on a constitutionally protected right of
mentally competent, terminally ill persons to commit physician-
assisted suicide, and was therefore unconstitutional. 265 The
court further held that this right derives from both the Due Pro-
cess Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 266 The court did not address the additional claims
asserted by plaintiff physicians or Compassion in Dying.267
The court relied on Planned Parenthood v. Casey2 .8 and
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health269 in holding
that a mentally competent, terminally ill adult has a protected
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in committing physician-assisted suicide. 270 The
court first examined the reasoning in Casey, which it stated was
"highly instructive and almost prescriptive .... "271 The court
reiterated much of what the Supreme Court said in Casey and it
extended the reasoning of that case, which dealt with the issue
of abortion, to Compassion in Dying and physician-assisted sui-
cide. 272 The court noted that, like abortion, the issue of physi-
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1462, 1467.
264. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 590 (9th Cir. 1995),
reh'g en banc granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995).
265. Compassion in Dying, 850 F.Supp. at 1467.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
269. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
270. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1462.
271. Id. at 1459. See supra notes 109-131 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the Casey decision.
272. Compassion in Dying, 850 F.Supp. at 1459-61.
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cian-assisted suicide is a controversial one, based on moral and
religious judgments. 273 However, the district court followed the
guidance of the Casey Court in realizing that a court's duty in
deciding cases dealing with these morally-charged issues "is not
to impose a particular moral standard."274 Refusing to mandate
its own moral code, the court held that the decision to commit
physician-assisted suicide is a constitutionally protected liberty
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment because "the suffer-
ing of a terminally ill person cannot be deemed any less inti-
mate or personal, or any less deserving of protection from
unwarranted governmental interference, than that of a preg-
nant woman."27
5
The court declined to abdicate its duty, in order to allow the
Washington State Legislature to decide the issue, because it de-
termined that the decision to commit physician-assisted suicide
is a constitutional right.27 6 The court also declined to recognize
any of the State's four arguments that Casey was inapposite to
the issue of physician-assisted suicide.277 First, the State ar-
gued that the level of personal autonomy involved is greater in
the case of abortion than in the case of physician-assisted sui-
cide because people have traditionally had more control over the
beginning of life than the end of life. 278 The court rejected this
argument, because it is not a distinction significant enough to
overcome the Equal Protection argument.279 Second, the State
argued that "the competing interests differ in cases involving
abortion versus cases involving" assisted suicide. 280 The court
agreed that the interests are different, but it determined that
the conflicting interests that are present when dealing with
abortion raise more difficult issues than do the conflicting inter-
ests that are present when dealing with assisted suicide. 28' The
court determined that this was true, because, in dealing with
abortion there are two lives involved - the life of the mother
273. Id. at 1460.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Compassion in Dying, 850 F.Supp. at 1460.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
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and the potential life of the fetus - and only the mother can
voice her desires; whereas, in dealing with assisted suicide,
there is only one life involved, and that person is able to express
her desires. 28 2 Third, the court discounted as unpersuasive the
State's argument that there is a "potential for abuse and undue
influence" present in recognizing a right to physician-assisted
suicide that is not present in the right to abortion. 283 Finally,
the State argued that there is a lack of medical knowledge
available about assisted suicide, but not about abortion, be-
cause more is known about the beginning of life than the end of
life.284 The court discounted this argument as irrelevant. 285
The court in Compassion in Dying further based its holding
on Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.286 The
court reasoned that if the United States Supreme Court was di-
rectly faced with the issue of whether a competent person has a
protected liberty interest in withdrawing life-sustaining medi-
cal treatment, the Court would reaffirm the tentative holding
stated in Cruzan that such an interest is constitutionally pro-
tected.287 Proceeding on this assumption, the Compassion in
Dying court determined that the only pertinent question is
"whether a constitutional distinction can be drawn between re-
fusal or withdrawal of medical treatment which results in
death, and the situation in this case, involving mentally compe-
tent, terminally ill individuals who wish to hasten death by self-
administering drugs prescribed by a physician."288 The court
then held that "[firom a constitutional perspective,... [no] dis-
tinction can be drawn between refusing life-sustaining medical
treatment and physician-assisted suicide by an uncoerced, men-
tally competent, terminally ill adult."289
The court, in applying the undue burden standard of review
which was set forth in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,290 ex-
282. Compassion in Dying, 850 F.Supp. at 1460.
283. Id. at 1461.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1461-62; Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990); see supra notes 168-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Cruzan decision.
287. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1461.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. 112 S. Ct. at 2830.
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amined the State's purported interests in maintaining the chal-
lenged statute.291 The State asserted that two State interests
were furthered by the Washington statute prohibiting assisted
suicide.292 The interests claimed by the State were the interest
in preventing suicide and the interest in protecting those per-
sons who might become eligible to commit physician-assisted
suicide from undue influence. 293
As to the State's purported interest in preventing suicide,
the State argued that its greatest concern was in preventing the
suicides of young people who were not terminally ill.294 The
State maintained that allowing the exception advanced by the
plaintiffs in this case would create a "slippery slope" by which
societal attitudes about suicide would become more permis-
sive.295 The State argued that as a result, a greater number of
healthy young people would cut short their lives by committing
suicide, people would be more ready to convince others to com-
mit suicide, and more individuals who were temporarily de-
pressed or mentally disturbed would commit suicide. 296
In addressing the State's arguments regarding its pur-
ported interest in preventing suicide, the court recognized that
the patient plaintiffs were terminally ill, not young, healthy
persons. 297 The State, in attempting to prolong the lives of per-
sons in plaintiffs' positions, was not furthering the interest of
preventing suicide, but instead, was simply prolonging the suf-
fering of individuals in the last stages of life, which could not
possibly be a legitimate state interest.298 The court recognized
that the State's concern was a valid one, but declined to allow
the slippery slope argument to prevail. 299 The court stated that
the difficulty in drawing appropriate boundaries to safeguard
against suicide by persons not terminally ill "[was] not a suffi-
cient excuse for precluding entirely the exercise of a constitu-
291. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1462-65.
292. Id. at 1464-65.
293. Id. at 1464.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1464.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 1465.
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tional right."300 The court then expressed confidence that the
legislature was capable of drafting appropriate legislation to al-
leviate the potential slippery slope problems.30 1
As to the State's purported interest in protecting persons
from committing suicide due to the undue influence of others,
the court recognized the legitimacy of the State's concern, but
again, refused to allow the State's concern to prevail over the
constitutional right of the patient plaintiffs and other persons
who are mentally competent and terminally ill.302 A variety of
factors led the court to this decision. First, the court stated that
patient plaintiffs and others like them who made a voluntary
choice to commit physician-assisted suicide fell outside of the
State's interest.30 3 Second, the court noted that the State of
Washington allowed mentally competent, terminally ill pa-
tients, or representatives of incompetent patients in some in-
stances, to disconnect life support.30 4 The court noted that
"[t]he potential risk of abuse and undue influence is often just
as great and may be greater in certain cases for a patient who
requests to be disconnected from a life support system,"305 espe-
cially when the request is made by a surrogate on behalf of an
incompetent person.306
In addition to holding the Washington statute prohibiting
assisted suicide unconstitutional as a violation of a person's lib-
erty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the court in Compassion in Dying further held the
statute unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.307 Under Washington
State law, similarly situated, mentally competent, terminally ill
adults have a legal right to refuse life-sustaining medical treat-
ment to hasten death.308 The court explained that the Equal
300. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1465.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1465.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 1467.
308. Id. at 1466-67 (citing In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445 (Wash. 1987)(en banc); In
re Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372 (Wash. 1984)(en banc); In re Bowman, 617 P.2d 731
(Wash. 1980); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983)); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 70.
122. 010 (West 1992 & West Supp. 1996)); see also WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 70. 122.
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Protection Clause "is essentially a direction that all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike."309 The court noted
that when a state law infringes upon the constitutionally pro-
tected personal rights of some individuals and not other individ-
uals who are similarly situated,3 10 or the fundamental rights of
one group more than another, similarly situated group,311 the
law is subject to strict scrutiny, in which case it will only be
upheld if the classifications are narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.312 The court then analyzed whether
there was enough of a distinction between these two groups of
terminally ill, mentally competent persons to treat members of
each particular group differently when one of the members
made the choice to die.3 13 The court found that the only distinc-
tion between the two groups is that members of one group are
connected to life support and members of the other group are
not.
3 14
The State argued that this distinction alone warrants the
disparate treatment because, when a person dies due to re-
moval of life-sustaining equipment, the death is "natural,"315
but when a person dies due to physician-assisted suicide, the
death is "artificial."31 6 The State argued that this distinction
between "natural" and "artificial" death creates a need for dif-
ferent treatment of the two groups because, while the State's
interest in deterring suicide is implicated in assisted suicide, it
010 (West 1992 & West Supp. 1996). Washington State's Natural Death Act
states that "adult persons have the fundamental right to control the decisions re-
lating to the rendering of their own health care, including the decision to have life-
sustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn, in instances of a terminal condition
or permanent unconscious condition." Id.
309. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1466 (quoting City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 216 (1982))).
310. Id. (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969)).
311. Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972)).
312. Id.
313. Id. at 1466-67.
314. Compassion in Dying, 850 F.Supp. at 1466.
315. Id. at 1467.
316. Id.
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is not implicated in the removal of life support.317 The court re-
jected the defendant's purported justification for the distinction
between the two groups in holding that the groups are similarly
situated.318 The court acknowledged that the State had an in-
terest in preventing suicide, but the court also stated that the
State previously recognized that its interest is not absolute
when it created an exception by allowing a terminally ill person
to refuse life sustaining medical treatment.31 9
The district court stated that Washington State law, in cre-
ating an exception that allowed terminally ill, mentally compe-
tent persons to discontinue life sustaining medical treatment to
hasten death, while not allowing terminally ill, mentally compe-
tent persons not on life support to enlist the aid of a physician
in hastening death, burdened the fundamental rights of one
group while not burdening the fundamental rights of another,
similarly situated group.320 Therefore, the court held that the
Washington statute prohibiting assisted suicide violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 21
D. The Decision of the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth
Circuit
1. The Majority Opinion
The State of Washington appealed from the decision of the
district court in Compassion in Dying.322 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of
the district court, holding that a mentally competent, termi-
nally ill person does not have a constitutional right to commit
physician-assisted suicide. 323 The court enumerated seven
grounds for holding that the judgment of the district court could
not be sustained.3 24
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Compassion in Dying, 850 F.Supp. at 1467.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 590 (9th Cir. 1995),
reh'g en banc granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995).
323. Id. at 588.
324. Id.
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First, the circuit court stated that the district court's reli-
ance on Planned Parenthood v. Casey325 was misplaced. 26 The
court reasoned that the language from Casey, upon which the
district court relied,327 could not be accurately applied to as-
sisted suicide because
[t]o take three sentences out of an opinion... dealing with ...
abortion and to find these sentences 'almost prescriptive' in ruling
on a statute proscribing the promotion of suicide is to make an
enormous leap, to do violence to the context, and to ignore the
differences between the regulation of reproduction and the pre-
vention of the promotion of killing a patient at his or her
request.328
The court further justified its finding that the district court's
reliance on Casey was misplaced by explaining that the cate-
gory that would be created from such reliance is "inherently un-
stable."3 29 The court held that if the decision to choose death
was held to involve "personal dignity and autonomy"330 and "the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life,"331 then that right
could not be limited to terminally ill, mentally competent pa-
tients, but instead, it would necessarily extend to "[t]he de-
pressed twenty-one year old, the romantically-devastated
twenty-eight year old, [and] the alcoholic forty-year old. . . ."332
The court stated that if this right exists, then "every man and
woman in the United States must enjoy it,"333 and any attempt
to restrict the right is "illusory."3u
Second, the circuit court stated that the decision of the dis-
trict court could not be sustained because the district court's re-
liance on Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health 35
325. 112 S.Ct. 2791.
326. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 590.
327. See supra notes 120, 270-71 and accompanying text.
328. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 590.
329. Id. at 590.
330. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992)).
331. Id. (quoting Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2807).
332. Id. at 590-91.
333. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591 (citing Yale Kamisar, Are the Laws
Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional? 23 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 32, 36-37
(May-June 1993)).
334. Id.
335. 497 U.S. 261.
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was misguided. The court stated that the district court's com-
parison of the assisted suicide issue to the termination of life
issue, which was the focus of Cruzan, was ill-informed, and that
the two issues were clearly distinguishable. 36
Third, the circuit court stated that there was no recent pre-
cedent to support the holding of the district court.337 "In the two
hundred and five years of our existence no constitutional right
to aid in killing oneself has ever been asserted and upheld by a
court of final jurisdiction."338 The court reasoned that a federal
court should not "invent" a constitutional right, where the right
did not exist in the past, especially when the right is contrary to
a main responsibility of the government. 339
Fourth, the circuit court argued that the district court erred
in holding the Washington statute invalid on its face.34° The
court stated that the "normal rule - the rule that governs here
- is that a facial challenge to a statute 'must establish that no
set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid.'"341 The court argued that there were situations where
the Washington statute could operate constitutionally.342 The
court stated that, unlike the statute at issue in Casey, which the
United States Supreme Court found would operate unconstitu-
tionally in a large percentage of cases, the Washington statute
involved in this case would operate effectively in numerous
cases.343 The court supported this finding by relying on state-
ments given by the physician plaintiffs in the case that these
physicians "occasionally" encountered patients whom the stat-
ute affected detrimentally.344
Fifth, the circuit court stated that the district court did not
adequately consider the relevant state interests, which, in the
opinion of the circuit court, outweighed any purported liberty
336. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591 (quoting United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
342. Id. at 591-92.
343. Id.
344. Id.
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interest in committing assisted suicide.3 45 The court held that
the State, at a minimum, had five relevant interests.346 First,
the court stated that the State had an interest in preventing
physicians from performing as killers.347 Second, the State had
an interest in preventing the elderly and infirm from experienc-
ing, and succumbing to, pressures to end their lives. 34s Third,
the State had an interest in protecting the poor and minorities
from being manipulated into committing assisted suicide.349
The court found that the poor and minorities would be particu-
larly vulnerable to this sort of manipulation because these
groups "are notoriously less provided for in the alleviation of
pain,"350 and because the public bears the bulk of the cost of
medical treatment to these patients, and there is, undoubtedly,
a desire to reduce the cost of public assistance.351 Fourth, the
state had an interest in protecting the handicapped from pres-
sures to commit physician-assisted suicide.3 52 The court found
that, similar to the poor and minorities, handicapped people
would be particularly vulnerable to manipulation to end their
lives, because of discrimination toward these people, and a de-
sire to reduce public costs. 353 The fifth and final state interest
cited by the circuit court was the interest in preventing abuse of
laws regulating assisted suicide, such as the abuses which have
reportedly transpired in the Netherlands. 354
The sixth reason given by the circuit court, as to why the
judgment of the district court could not stand, was that judg-
ment was too indefinite.35 5 The circuit court stated that it was
unclear on whose behalf the judgment of the district court was
345. Id. The court considered two state studies in its analysis of state's inter-
ests in prohibiting assisted suicide. Id. at 591-92 (citing WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT.
ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CoNTExT (1994) and MICHIGAN
COMMISSION ON DEATH AND DYING, FINAL REPORT (1994)).
346. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 592.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 591-92 (citing WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT. ASSISTED SUICIDE AND Eu-
THANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CoNTExT at 100).
351. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591-92 (citing WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT.
ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CoNTExT at 129).
352. Id. at 592.
353. Id. at 592-93.
354. Id. at 593.
355. Id.
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entered. 356 The circuit court stated that the judgment rendered
by the district court must have been entered on behalf of future
terminally ill patients of the plaintiff physicians, and not on be-
half of the plaintiff patients, since two of the patient plaintiffs
died before the judgment was entered, and the third plaintiff
patient died while the case was pending appeal. 57 However,
the circuit court argued that the judgment of the district court
could not stand effectively in favor of future terminally ill pa-
tients of the plaintiff physicians because the district court failed
to define the term "terminally ill," and therefore, failed to estab-
lish a class of persons who would be protected by the judg-
ment.35 8 The circuit court argued that there is a great deal of
disagreement about the definition of the term "terminally ill"
among the states. 359 Therefore, in order for the district court to
have entered its judgment in favor of a class of persons, it was
necessary for the court to first define the term "terminally ill,"
so that the persons within the class could be identified. 360
Finally, the circuit court stated that the judgment of the
district court could not stand because the Washington statute
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 61 The circuit court stated that, contrary to the
holding of the district court, there exists a logical distinction be-
tween "actions taking life and actions by which life is not sup-
ported or ceases to be supported."362 The court further
explained that, because "[t]he distinction ... drawn by the legis-
lature [was] not [drawn] on the basis of race, gender or religion
or membership in any protected class and [was] not infringing
any fundamental constitutional right, [the distinction] must be
upheld unless the plaintiffs can show that the legislature's ac-
tions were irrational.' ",363 In other words, the applicable stan-
dard of review, when determining whether the statute violates
356. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 593.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 592.
361. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 592.
362. Id.
363. Id. (quoting Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988)).
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the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is
rationality, and not strict scrutiny.36 4
The court applied the rationality standard and determined
that the distinction drawn by the legislature, between a physi-
cian withdrawing or withholding life support, and a physician
.assisting in a suicide, is rational.365 The court explained that
privacy means "the right to be let alone,"36 6 and that it does not
go so far as to allow one person to enlist the aid of another in
hastening death.36 7 The court further reasoned that, in order to
protect the relevant state interests,368 the distinction drawn by
the legislature was reasonable. 369 The court concluded that
since the plaintiff's failed to show that the distinction drawn by
the legislature was irrational, the statute did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause.370
2. The Dissenting Opinion
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Wright asserted that termi-
nally ill, mentally competent individuals have a guaranteed pri-
vacy right to commit physician-assisted suicide, and that the
Washington statute proscribing that right was unconstitu-
tional.371 First, the dissent addressed the premise of the major-
ity that, if there is a right to commit physician-assisted suicide,
that right depends on the definition of "terminally ill."372 In the
opinion of the dissent, it was the duty of the court to decide the
issue before it, as it applied to the parties before the court, and
not to define the parameters of the right to commit physician-
assisted suicide.3 73 From this perspective, the court needed only
to consider the potential right to commit physician-assisted sui-
cide as it applied to mentally competent, terminally ill adults.3 74
It did not need to concern itself with the "depressed twenty-one
364. See id. at 593.
365. Id. at 593.
366. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 593 (citing Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
367. Id. at 594.
368. See supra notes 345-54 and accompanying text.
369. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 594.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 594, 597 (Wright, J., dissenting).
372. Id. at 594.
373. Id.
374. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 594-95.
1996] 403
45
PACE LAW REVIEW
year old," because none of the parties before the court fit that
description. 375 The dissent noted that the "[pilaintiffs [were]...
suggesting a limited form of physician-assisted suicide."3 76 The
dissent then addressed the aspects of the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses significant to the issue of physician-
assisted suicide.377
In examining the relevant aspects of the Due Process
Clause, the dissent discussed the right to privacy, the applica-
ble standard of review, and the validity of the application of the
Washington statute prohibiting assisted suicide.378 The dissent
first noted that the United States Supreme Court, in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,379 defined the scope of liberty interests
protected by the Due Process Clause. 380 The language used in
this definition was the same language relied on by the district
court in the case at bar, and the same language the majority
said was inapplicable to the issue of physician-assisted sui-
cide.31' The dissent urged that, contrary to the finding of the
majority, the Supreme Court did not limit this definition to
abortion, but instead stated that it was "general language ...
derived from well-established Supreme Court precedent," appli-
cable to all liberty interests protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 38 2 This contention is evi-
denced by other language used by the Court in the same para-
graph citing other rights, in addition to abortion, that have been
held to be protected liberty interests.3 83 The dissent concluded
that the language is, therefore, equally applicable in the context
of physician-assisted suicide,38 4 and that "[t]he right to die with
dignity falls squarely within the privacy right recognized by the
Supreme Court."38 5
375. Id. at 594.
376. Id. at 594-95 n.2 (quoting Quill v. Koppell, 870 F.Supp. 78, 84 (S.D.N.Y.
1994)).
377. Id. at 595 (Wright, J., dissenting).
378. Id. at 595-97.
379. 112 U.S. 2791.
380. Compassion in Dying, at 595 (quoting Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807). See
supra note 120 and accompanying text.
381. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 596 (Wright, J., dissenting).
382. Id.
383. Id. (quoting Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807).
384. Id. at 595 (Wright, J., dissenting).
385. Id.
404 [Vol. 16:359
46http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol16/iss2/12
COMPASSION IN DYING
The dissent then looked to Cruzan v. Director, Missouri De-
partment of Health3 6 to further support the conclusion that the
right to die with dignity is a protected liberty interest.3 7 It
noted that the Cruzan Court recognized that "[tihe choice be-
tween life and death is a deeply personal decision," and that the
"principle that a competent person has a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment
may be inferred from our prior decisions."388 The dissent then
concluded that "[a] constitutional distinction cannot be drawn
between refusing life-sustaining medical treatment and ac-
cepting physician assistance in hastening death."389 The dis-
sent stated that, were this distinction drawn, the consequences
would be "patently unjust."39°
The dissent argued that, contrary to the opinion of the ma-
jority, the right to commit physician-assisted suicide is sup-
ported by traditional American values.3 91 This dissent stated
that American values strongly embrace the concepts of auton-
omy and self-determination, and these values are reflected in
American history.392 "No right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded, than the right of every individual to the pos-
session and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others unless by clear and unquestioned author-
ity of law."393 While it is true that the right to commit physi-
cian-assisted suicide is not reflected in American history in the
traditional sense, a lack of precedent cannot always control the
courts. 394 Rapid advancement of medical technology makes it
impossible for a court to determine whether the right to commit
physician-assisted suicide is supported by American values by
386. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
387. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 595 (Wright, J., dissenting).
388. Id. (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281, 278).
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 596.
392. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 596 (Wright, J., dissenting).
393. Id. (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891)).
394. Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (where the United States
Supreme Court ignored American tradition and the lack of precedent and based its
holding on the "rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness of free men."))
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simply looking to precedent. 395 The essence of the right is
strongly supported by American values.3 96
Having found that the right to commit physician-assisted
suicide is a constitutional right, the dissent determined that the
applicable standard of review is strict scrutiny.397 The dissent
rejected the undue burden standard in this case because it con-
cluded that the Supreme Court formulated that standard solely
for cases dealing with the issue of abortion.3 98
The dissent determined that the Washington statute was
unconstitutional as applied to mentally competent, terminally
ill individuals.3 99 It recognized the state's interest in protecting
life, but it agreed with the Quinlan court that "the state's inter-
est weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as natu-
ral death approaches."400  It concluded that, since the
Washington legislature is capable of drafting legislation that
protects the constitutional rights of mentally competent, termi-
nally ill individuals, the statute does not pass strict scrutiny,
and is therefore unconstitutional. 401
Finally, the dissent considered whether the Washington
statute proscribing physician-assisted suicide violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 40 2 The
court recognized that Washington state law allows terminally
ill, mentally competent patients to enlist the aid of a physician
in withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment,40 3 but pro-
hibits terminally ill, mentally competent patients from enlisting
the aid of a physician to aid them in committing suicide.
40 4
Having decided that there is a constitutionally protected right
to commit physician-assisted suicide, the dissent determined
that "Washington's laws abrogate the fundamental rights of one
395. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 596 (Wright, J., dissenting).
396. Id.
397. Id. (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)).
398. Id.
399. Id. at 597.
400. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 596 (Wright, J., dissenting) (quoting In
re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, Garger v. New Jersey, 429
U.S. 922 (1976)).
401. Id. at 597.
402. Id.
403. Id. (citing In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445 (1987)(en banc); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. 70.122.010 (West 1992 & West Supp. 1996)).
404. Id.
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group, but not those of a similarly situated group, [and there-
fore,] they must be subjected to strict scrutiny and upheld only
if the classifications are suitably tailored to serve a compelling
state interest."40 5 The dissent explained that, in its view, the
two groups were similarly situated because they both include
mentally competent, terminally ill adults. 406 The only differ-
ence between the two groups is that one is receiving life-sus-
taining medical treatment and the other is not.40 7 The dissent
believed that disparate treatment afforded individuals within
the two groups, based solely on this distinction, "is not suitably
tailored to serve a compelling state interest."408
The dissent stated that terminally ill, mentally competent
patients have a fundamental right to commit physician-assisted
suicide. 40 9 Therefore, the dissent concluded, the Washington
statute proscribing these individuals from making that choice
violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 410
IV. Analysis
The decision of the district court in Compassion in Dying411
reflects the growing acceptance of assisted suicide among Amer-
icans.412 It also reflects a growing desire of many Americans to
be able to make their own decisions about personal issues in-
volving their lives and deaths, without undue interference from
the government. 41 3 Because of technological advances in
medicine, including the development of sophisticated life-sus-
taining machines, people are living longer, and they are dying
405. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 597 (Wright, J., dissenting).
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 597 (Wright, J., dissenting).
411. 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995),
reh'g en banc granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995).
412. Gilbert Meilaender, Human Equality and Assistance in Suicide, 19 SEC-
OND OPINION 16 (1994).
413. Gleicher, supra note 58 at 184. See also, Burton C. Einspruch, MD, Eu-
thanasia, 269 JAMA 1568-69 (1993) (reviewing DAVID CUNDIFF, EuTHANASIA IS
NOT THE ANSWER: A HOSPICE PHYSICIAN'S VIEW (1992)). The rate of suicide among
the elderly has dramatically increased in recent years. Id. at 1568.
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from illnesses that are degenerative and drawn out.414 "An in-
advertent and unintended side effect of medicine's growing ef-
fectiveness is that the dying process has been elongated....
Through transfusions, antibiotics, and artificial feeding, dying
can be unthinkingly extended well beyond the point where liv-
ing has any meaning to either the individual or the family."415
The development of these sophisticated life-sustaining technolo-
gies and their effects of prolonging life, coupled with the shift in
places where people die, from homes to hospitals and institu-
tions, has greatly increased public concern and awareness of
medical choices of individuals near the end of life.416 Many peo-
ple fear dying a degenerative and painful death, and they want
to be assured that they will be able to die in peace, and with
dignity.417 "[Flor many the most frightening aspect of death is
:. . the prospect of losing control and independence, and dying
in an undignified, unesthetic, absurd, and existentially unac-
ceptable condition."418 An increasingly growing sentiment in
this country, shared by many individuals including people who
are needlessly suffering from terminal illnesses and people who
have watched loved ones suffer from these illnesses, is this:
"Life is precious. But life without dignity, life with unremitting
pain, life with no hope of recovery, is utter hell.... [Elnding the
enormous pain of individuals under limited circumstances isn't
a denigration of life, but rather a celebration."419
A. Privacy Analysis
It is firmly established, through a long line of Supreme
Court cases, that every individual possesses a right to personal
414. The Right to Die, supra note 45, at 14. "The Office of Technology Assess-
ment Task Force estimated in 1988 that, 3775 to 6575 persons were dependent on
mechanical ventilation and 1,404,500 persons were receiving artificial nutritional
support." Council Report, supra note 15, at 2229.
415. QUILL, supra note 34, at 50.
416. Council Report, supra note 15, at 2229.
417. Id. This is evidenced by the tremendous public reaction to Derek
Humphrey's book Final Exit, which is a "manual for suicide." See Dennis L. Breo,
MD-aided Suicide Voted Down; Both Sides Say Debate to Continue, 266 JAMA
2895, 2899 (1991). Final Exit is on the best-seller list and has sold over a half a
million copies. Id.
418. QUILL, supra note 34, at 166.
419. Ed Koch, Assisted Suicides - A Personal Perspective, N.Y. PosT, Dec. 2,
1994, at 27.
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autonomy and self-determination that is protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 420 This right,
deemed a privacy or liberty right, encompasses smaller rights
which are considered fundamental to human beings, because
the choices associated with the rights affect a person so deeply,
and are so intimate and personal, that they should be made by
individuals without undue interference from the government. 421
The district court in Compassion in Dying 22 was correct in
holding that a terminally ill, mentally competent adult has a
constitutionally protected privacy right to commit physician-as-
sisted suicide. The right to commit physician-assisted suicide,
like other protected privacy rights, concerns an intimate and
personal decision that a human being should have the privilege
to make without undue governmental interference. 423 The fact
that there is no controlling precedent directly on point, to in-
form the courts that the right to commit physician-assisted sui-
cide falls within the protected privacy rights of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is not, in itself, dispositive.A As the dissent to
the circuit court opinion in Compassion in Dying pointed out,
the right to commit physician-assisted suicide is supported by
the traditional American values. 2 5 Americans jealously guard
the rights to autonomy and self-determination, which are so in-
tricately entangled with the right to commit physician-assisted
suicide, and the courts must consider this, instead of simply
considering that there is no precedent supporting a right to
commit physician-assisted suicide, in a situation such as this,
where advances in medical technology have changed the land-
scape of the right so dramatically from that which it was histor-
420. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
421. E.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805-07, 11 (1992).
422. 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995),
reh'g en banc granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995).
423. Gleicher, supra note 58, at 184. "A noble, dignified death is exalted in
great literature, poetry, are, and music, and its meaning is deeply personal and
unique." QUILL, supra note 34, at 158.
424. Gleicher, supra note 58, at 184. See also, Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d
at 596 (Wright, J., dissenting)(citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)(where
the United States Supreme Court ignored American tradition and lack of prece-
dent and based its holding on the "rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happi-
ness of free men."))
425. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 596 (Wright, J., dissenting).
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ically.426 In applying the Constitution, the courts must look not
only to the past, but also to the future.427 "Constitutional law
evolves as cases, and social issues, arise, and right-to-die litiga-
tion is still in its infancy."428 The personal decision of a termi-
nally ill person to end her life in order to terminate unbearable
pain and suffering and to preserve dignity is no less significant
to her personal autonomy than the choice to obtain an abortion
or to use contraceptives, and it certainly cannot be realistically
differentiated from a person's choice to terminate life support.
429
The right of a terminally ill, mentally competent person to com-
mit physician-assisted suicide is a logical extension of existing
jurisprudence dealing with privacy rights. "The case for physi-
cian assisted suicide builds on the line of opinions clothing pri-
vate choices with constitutional dimension, and takes it a
further, logical step."430
Contrary to the circuit court's opinion in Compassion in Dy-
ing, the district court's reliance on Planned Parenthood v.
Casey43 1 was well-founded. The United States Supreme Court
has upheld the basic holding of Roe v. Wade432 consistently for
over two decades, so that it is now firmly established that a wo-
man has a constitutional right to obtain an abortion, and that
this right is part of the greater right of privacy which derives
from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 433
The analogy drawn by the district court in Compassion in Dying
between abortion and physician-assisted suicide was logical and
unmistakably accurate, and since the Supreme Court has left
little doubt that the right to obtain an abortion is a fundamen-
tal privacy right,434 it must follow that the right to physician-
assisted suicide is also a protected privacy right. A thorough
comparison of the two issues, abortion and physician-assisted
426. Id.
427. Id. (citing Olnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
428. Gleicher, supra note 58, at 186.
429. Id. at 186-87.
430. Id. at 186.
431. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
432. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
433. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804.
434. Id.
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suicide, can lead to no other conclusion but that, if the former is
a protected liberty interest, the latter must be as well.
The issues surrounding the rights to abortion and physi-
cian-assisted suicide have many significant parallels that
should be considered when determining whether each of the
rights should be afforded the same constitutional protection.
Both a decision to obtain an abortion and a decision to commit
physician-assisted suicide are extremely personal decisions
dealing with issues concerning each person's unique definition
of his or her own sense of self.435 They both deal with quality of
life, and the relevant question, "What quality of life is worth
maintaining?" It may be argued that a person is entitled to de-
fine her own being without enlisting the help of others, and
that, if she feels that the quality of life she is living is too poor to
continue, she may, without legal repercussion, end her own life.
While this is all true, the right to end one's own life cannot stop
there. For if the right to abortion stopped at a parallel position,
at this do-it-yourself level, where would that leave a woman in
need of an abortion? Just as the right to obtain an abortion nec-
essarily expands, to enable an individual seeking to exercise the
right to enlist the help of a doctor in getting the abortion,43 so
must the right to end one's own life expand, so that a person
who is mentally competent and terminally ill may enlist the
help of a doctor in ending life. This extension to a third person
is the only way that a mentally competent, terminally ill indi-
vidual may fully exercise the right to end her own life.43 7
There have traditionally been the same end-of-life concerns
surrounding both abortion and assisted suicide. Assisted sui-
cide is considered a criminal act and is illegal in every country
in the world, including the United States.438 Similarly,
although it is now firmly established that abortion is legal,4 9
right-to-life advocates contend that abortion is murder.440 The
435. Gleicher, supra note 58 (citing Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805-07).
436. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
437. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 670 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, Garger v.
New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445-46
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 497, 481 (1965)).
438. See supra notes 24-31, 61 and accompanying text.
439. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
440. David Gibson, A Pro-Choice Morality?; Supporters of Abortion Rights Try
to Recast the Debate While Opponents Prepare to Protest Tomorrow on the 23rd
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courts have evaded the legal problems produced by this conten-
tion by creating the legal fiction that a fetus is not a person.441
Therefore, the termination of a pregnancy cannot be murder be-
cause, since there is no person, there is no taking of a life.442 A
similar legal fiction may be used by the courts in order to re-
move physician-assisted suicide from the definition of homicide.
Where the terminally ill patient is experiencing intolerable pain
and suffering, the interest of the state in preserving life van-
ishes. 443 At that point, the only thing that is being preserved is
the intolerable pain and suffering that must be endured by a
person who is no longer living life, but is simply waiting to die
so that the suffering will end.4" How can it be said that it is
criminal to help an individual in this condition to hasten death?
How can a state successfully prosecute the aider for assisting in
ending a life when the state no longer has an interest in the
life?
Physician-assisted suicide and abortion are each sensitive
issues that lead to emotionally-charged debates fraught with
moral and religious opinions.445 But as the Supreme Court has
stated, "[its] obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to man-
date [its] own moral code." 446 The Supreme Court has success-
fully managed to extricate the issue of abortion from the
religious and moral judgments which emanate from it, and has
thus consistently held that a woman has a constitutionally pro-
tected privacy right to obtain an abortion.447 The Court must
react with the same restraint and integrity when and if the is-
sue of physician-assisted suicide is before it.
The district court further held, in Compassion in Dying,
that a protected privacy right to commit physician-assisted sui-
cide could be inferred from Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Depart-
Anniversary of Roe v. Wade, THE RECORD (New Jersey), Jan. 21, 1996, Review &
Outlook at 001.
441. See Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
442. Id.
443. Gleicher, supra note 58, at 187.
444. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
445. See Ronald Dworkin, When is it Right to Die?, BALTIMORE SUN, May 18,
1994 at 13A.
446. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806 (1992).
447. See id., 112 S. Ct. at 2804, 2806.
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ment of Health,4" and the circuit court criticized this holding,
stating that the district court's reliance on Cruzan in reaching
this holding was misguided." 9 This reliance was based almost
entirely upon two statements made by the Cruzan Court.450
First, the district court relied on the assumption made by the
Cruzan Court that, for the purposes of Cruzan, a mentally com-
petent, terminally ill patient had a constitutional right, under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to dis-
continue life-sustaining medical treatment.451 Second, the dis-
trict court relied on the statement made by the Cruzan Court
that the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment could
be inferred from prior Supreme Court decisions.452 The district
court in Compassion in Dying assumed that if the United
States Supreme Court were squarely faced with the issue in the
future, it would extend this tentative holding to all mentally
competent, terminally individuals.453
It may be a viable argument that if the Supreme Court
holds that there is a constitutionally protected privacy right to
discontinue life-sustaining medical treatment, then it should
follow that there is also a constitutionally protected privacy
right to commit physician-assisted suicide. However, there is a
huge leap between the United States Supreme Court assuming
for the purposes of one case that a right exists, and the Court
actually holding that the right exists for all persons in a partic-
ular class or in all cases brought by those persons. The state-
ment in Cruzan that the Court would assume, for the purposes
of Cruzan, that a mentally competent, terminally ill person has
a constitutional right to discontinue life support, was tentative
at best. It was not a sufficient ground for a district court to rely
on in holding that mentally competent, terminally ill patients
have a constitutional right to commit physician-assisted
suicide.
448. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1461-62 (W.D.
Wash. 1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g en banc granted, 62 F.3d 299
(9th Cir. 1995); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
449. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591.
450. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1461-62.
451. Id. at 1461.
452. Id.
453. Id.
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B. Equal Protection Analysis
The argument that a mentally competent, terminally ill pa-
tient has a constitutional right to commit physician-assisted su-
icide under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is a particularly valid one. Most states have recog-
nized the right of patients to refuse or withdraw medical treat-
ment, even if that treatment is life-sustaining.' 4 Additionally,
the United States Supreme Court has indicated, at least per-
functorily, that the right to refuse or discontinue life-sustaining
medical treatment may be considered a constitutional right, by
assuming for the purposes of Cruzan that the right existed,455
and by stating the principle "that a competent person has a con-
stitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions."456
However, the court is yet to rule on this issue. 5 7 Although it is
slightly presumptuous at this point for a lower court to rely on
the assumption that the Court will clothe the right to refuse or
discontinue life-sustaining medical treatment with constitu-
tional significance, there is some indication that this will be the
case. Considering, however, that the Court has not yet held
that mentally competent, terminally ill patients have a consti-
tutional right to discontinue life-sustaining medical treat-
ment,'458 relying on the Court's tentative statements about one
case is not the best avenue for a federal district court to take in
holding that a constitutional right exists.
In holding that there is a right to commit physician-as-
sisted suicide protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the district court in Compassion in
Dying relied on the determination that there is a constitutional
right, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, to commit physician-assisted suicide.459 In essence, the
court built its equal protection argument squarely on top of its
due process argument.460 It was not necessary for the court to
454. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W. 2d 408 at 412 n.4. (Mo. 1988) (en banc),
aff'd, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
455. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
456. Id. at 278.
457. See generally id.
458. See id., at 278-79.
459. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 270.
460. See id.
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do this.461 Whether or not there is a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in committing physician-assisted suicide has lit-
tle relevance in the context of equal protection. 462 Within that
context, it is immaterial whether a state holds that the right to
refuse or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment is a con-
stitutional liberty interest or is, instead, a common law right.463
If the state recognizes the right of one group of mentally compe-
tent, terminally ill patients to refuse or withdraw life-sus-
taining medical treatment, it must also recognize the right of
the other group of mentally competent, terminally ill patients to
commit physician-assisted suicide, because there is no rational,
constitutional basis for discriminating between these two
classes of persons. 464
In some instances, a terminally ill person may be kept alive
solely by sophisticated life-sustaining treatments, such as
mechanical ventilation. 465 In these instances, a physician may,
ethically and legally withhold or withdraw the life-sustaining
treatment at the request of the patient, if that patient is compe-
tent.466 In some of these cases, the physician may also withhold
or withdraw the treatment from an incompetent patient, at the
request of a surrogate decisionmaker. 467 In other instances, a
terminally ill patient may be kept alive through the use of arti-
ficial nutrition or hydration.46 In these instances, the patient
is afforded the same rights as a patient who is kept alive by
461. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972).
462. See id. It is significant in the context of equal protection whether a right
is deemed "fundamental." See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993). This is
because if the right is deemed to be a fundamental right, then a court, in examin-
ing a statute which allegedly infringes on that right, will use strict scrutiny. Id. If
the right is not deemed "fundamental," then the court will use mere rationality.
See Eisenstadt, 405 The statute will be more likely struck down under the strict
scrutiny standard of review, but it will also be struck down under the mere ration-
ality standard where the state had no rational basis for drawing the distinction
that imposes different treatment on different persons. See id.
463. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447.
464. See id.
465. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 653-54 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, Garger
v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
466. Council Report, supra note 15, at 2230-31.
467. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647, 669-70.
468. See Council Report, supra note 15, at 2231.
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other forms of life-sustaining treatment.469 A comparison of the
rights afforded to a mentally competent, terminally ill patient
who is sustained by artificial nutrition or hydration, and the
rights afforded to a mentally competent, terminally ill patient
who is not sustained by any artificial means, shows the starkest
picture of the blatant inequity in the law as it now stands.
A comparison of the two situations shows that it is the
source of nourishment of the terminally ill patient that is the
determinative factor in whether or not the terminally ill person
may obtain aid in dying from a physician. 470 One of these termi-
nally ill, mentally competent individuals obtains nourishment
through a feeding or hydration tube, while the other either eats
normally, or attempts to eat normally, but can no longer main-
tain a normal diet because of her illness. The first person, who
obtains nourishment through a feeding or hydration tube, has
the right to enlist the help of a physician in hastening death
through removal of the feeding tube.471 The other person, who
is not aided in obtaining nourishment, is not afforded such a
choice.472 Without the aid of a physician to help end her suffer-
ing, the terminally ill patient, who is free from life-sustaining
medical equipment, has limited choices. The only equality in
the above situation, as the law now stands, is that either one of
these terminally ill patients may elect to starve themselves to
death. That is where the parallel ends. Because one patient is
connected to a feeding tube, her election to enlist the aid of a
physician to remove the feeding tube is considered a "natural"
way to die,473 while the other patient's choice to starve to death
is considered suicide which, while not illegal,'474 is poorly re-
garded by many people in society.
The disparity in treatment of mentally competent, termi-
nally ill patients based solely on source of nourishment illus-
469. Id. See also Wanzer, supra note 32, at 844 (stating that it is a common
belief among physicians and ethicists that there is little difference between feeding
or hydration tubes and other life-sustaining medical treatment, and, therefore,
withdrawing feeding or hydration tubes is an accepted practice by most physicians,
ethicists, and even most courts).
470. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
471. Council Report, supra note 15, at 2231.
472. E.g., id., at 2233.
473. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 669-70 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, Garger v.
New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
474. LAFAvE, supra note 54, at 568-69.
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trates the most blatant example of the similarity of the
situations of these two individuals. But, just as this difference
in source of nourishment is not a rational basis for allowing one
patient to enlist the help of a physician when she chooses to end
her life, and not allowing the other patient the same right,
neither is the most extreme situation on the opposite end of the
spectrum a rational basis for the disparate treatment of the
two individuals.
C. Asserted Dangers and Concerns Associated with the
Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide
Opponents of assisted suicide argue that there are numer-
ous dangers inherent in legalizing assisted suicide for termi-
nally ill, mentally competent persons.475 One frequently stated
argument is that legalizing assisted suicide will lead to the
"slippery slope." 476 There are several versions of the "slippery
slope" argument.477 One version is that a rule such as the one
laid down by the district court in Compassion in Dying, which
recognizes physician-assisted suicide as a constitutional right of
mentally competent, terminally ill patients, will not remain so
narrow.478 Opponents argue that a rule legalizing physician-as-
sisted suicide in any degree will eventually be extended by the
courts to include people other than mentally competent, termi-
nally ill adults.479 It may eventually be extended to allow physi-
cians to administer the lethal substance, therefore extending
the legalization of physician-assisted suicide to legalized eutha-
nasia.48 0 A second version of the "slippery slope" argument is
that there is a danger that physicians will execute sick, un-
wanted, elderly people who do not wish to die.48' Yet another
version of the "slippery slope" argument is that individuals who
do not wish to commit suicide may nonetheless elect to commit
physician-assisted suicide because of the financial strain that
their illnesses are placing on their families.48 2 Along the same
475. E.g., Glasson, supra note 13, at 92-96.
476. Id. at 96.
477. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 445, at 13A.
478. Glasson, supra note 13, at 96.
479. See id.
480. Id.
481. Dworkin, supra note 445, at 13A.
482. Id.
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lines, individuals who do not wish to hasten death may be
coaxed or persuaded to commit physician-assisted suicide by
family members who have financial concerns. 48 3 Opponents of
assisted suicide also argue that physicians are healers, and
should not be thrust into the role of killer by legislatures and
courts.48 4 This argument is easily countered by proponents of
physician-assisted suicide. 48 5 "The argument that euthanasia
violates the physician's role as healer is utter hypocrisy. Death
is a part of life and a big part of medicine. Every physician
knows this."48 6 These statements are equally applicable to phy-
sician-assisted suicide. Additionally, it is relevant to note that
the American Medical Association regards physicians as having
three roles: "[pihysicians are healers of disease and injury, pre-
servers of life, and relievers of suffering."487 While opponents of
physician-assisted suicide argue that the practice of physicians
assisting terminally ill patients to die is contrary to the role of
the physician as healer, proponents of physician-assisted sui-
cide argue that the practice of physicians refusing to aid termi-
nally ill patients in dying is against the role of "reliever of
suffering," and when that terminally ill patient is racked with
excruciating pain that can no longer be relieved, the only role
left open for a physician to perform is "reliever of suffering."488
"When treating a dying person, the role of the Hippocratic Oath
usually shifts.... The primary goal usually shifts away from
extending life toward lessening physical, emotional, and spiri-
tual suffering."48 9
D. Dangers Are Not Controlling
Unquestionably, there are dangers that go along with legal-
izing physician-assisted suicide, just as there are dangers that
accompany other constitutional rights.490 Fortunately, compe-
tent legislators have found, and are finding, ways to deal with
483. Id.
484. QUILL, supra note 34, at 166.
485. Breo, supra note 417, at 2900.
486. Id.
487. Council Report, supra note 15, at 2230 (emphasis added).
488. See QUILL, supra note 34, at 43-44.
489. Id. at 44.
490. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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many problems inherent in other legally protected rights.491
The fact that there are dangers inherent in a constitutional
right is not a reason for lawmakers to ignore it. The legislature
can regulate physician-assisted suicide and find solutions to al-
leviate the dangers involved.492
In Compassion in Dying, the district court did not specifi-
cally address a solution to the problems that will inevitably
arise from the dangers of recognizing physician-assisted suicide
as a constitutionally protected right.493 Although the court
failed to propose a proper solution to be used in order to avoid
these dangers, and although this omission may be viewed as a
flaw in the district court's decision, the omission should not be
viewed as an indicator that there are no solutions to the dan-
gers that attach to this constitutional right. The potential dan-
gers do not necessarily have to become realities. 494 The state
legislatures and appeals courts have the power and the re-
sources to assure that the potential dangers that are inherent
in assisted suicide are effectively avoided. Several attempts
have already been made by physicians, organizations, and
lawmakers in this country to set out appropriate guidelines
under which physician-assisted suicide can be practiced with
minimal risks.495 Using these guidelines as a starting point, ac-
ceptable effective laws may be drafted in dealing with physi-
cian-assisted suicide. "[Terminally ill patients facing
intolerable suffering] should not be held hostage to our reluc-
tance or inability to forge policies in this difficult terrain."496
V. Conclusion
The district court's reliance, in Compassion in Dying, on
Planned Parenthood v. Casey was well-founded and in compli-
ance with the attitudes of many Americans today, and the cir-
cuit court in Compassion in Dying was short sighted and
491. Lehr, supra note 26, at 6.
492. Id.
493. 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1465 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.
1995), reh'g en banc granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995).
494. See The Right to Die, supra note 45, at 14.
495. See QuiLL, supra note 34, at 159-64; Compassion in Dying Executive Di-
rector's Report at 4 (on file with author); Death With Dignity Act, 1995 Or. Laws
Ch. 3 I.M. No. 16.
496. QUILL, supra note 34, at 161.
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incorrect in holding that the district court's reliance on Casey
was misplaced. There are many significant parallels between
abortion and physician-assisted suicide that ultimately must
lead to the conclusion that these two rights should be afforded
the same constitutional protection. The analogy made by the
district court in Compassion in Dying to the termination of life-
sustaining medical treatment is also feasible, but the fact re-
mains that the Cruzan Court did not hold that an individual
has a constitutional right to remove life-sustaining medical
treatment. Until the Supreme Court hands down such a hold-
ing, analogising physician-assisted suicide to the removal of
life-sustaining medical treatment, for the purpose of extending
the right of privacy to physician-assisted suicide, is futile.
The argument by the district court in Compassion in Dying
that the right to commit physician-assisted suicide is protected
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is a valid argument, but the argument is not necessarily
dependent upon the right of privacy. Because there is no ra-
tional basis for treating the two groups of mentally competent,
terminally ill patients differently, the right to commit physi-
cian-assisted suicide exists under the Equal Protection Clause,
even if the United States Supreme Court finds that the right to
commit physician-assisted suicide is not a protected privacy in-
terest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The basic holding of the district court in Compassion in Dy-
ing is sound, and it is the path that many individuals in this
country are urging the law to take. Conversely, the basic hold-
ing of the circuit court is short-sighted and colored by the moral
attitudes of the majority judges. The decision of the district
court will inevitably lead the way to the recognition of a new
constitutional right in the United States. If and when the
United States Supreme Court grants certiorari to determine
whether there is a constitutional right to commit physician-as-
sisted suicide, the Court should follow the lead of the district
court in Compassion in Dying in holding that there is a consti-
tutional right to commit physician-assisted suicide under both
420 [Vol. 16:359
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the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
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